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ABSTRACT
BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: THE QUANDARY THE CIA NOW FACES IN
LIGHT OF EMPLOYING ENHANCED INTERROGATION METHODS TO
COMBAT THE WAR ON TERROR

By
Joshua Laufer
May 2011

Dissertation supervised by
The outcry of torture being used during CIA interrogations of enemy combatants
at Guantanamo Bay and other sites certainly jolted international humanitarians. With
modern warfare evolving towards unconventional warfare, the notion of interrogation has
become more controversial and linked hand-in-hand with torture methods. This study is
not trying to make a case for torture, but instead seeks to provide qualitative reasoning
through primary and secondary sources which some seek to support enhanced
interrogation.
It will be important to identify why enhanced interrogation techniques are
effective and deemed essential by some. If certain enhanced methods create extreme
physical and emotional duress, then they will be considered methods of torture and
inappropriate to employ to extract intelligence from combatants. This study expects to
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find that there is a tautological connection between counterterrorism and the interrogation
methods. Although positive international law permits the use of certain techniques, there
is an ever-growing negative opinion of all borderline methods throughout the
international community.
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1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

BACKGROUND ON THE CIA
Does the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) utilize enhanced interrogation

techniques or torture methods when attempting to extract intelligence from enemy
combatants? This has been the question military personnel, the mainstream media, and
the Federal Government have been asking themselves for years. Since its creation in
1947, the CIA has been considered the final arbiter in intelligence collection and analysis
for American national security. With the War on Terror raging and the numerous cries
from prisoners claiming ill treatment at the hands of CIA personnel, however, the Agency
seems to have moved into a gray area of intelligence operations compared to its original
intent.
Views on the current mission of the CIA have changed dramatically since the
Agency‘s inception. It reflects how the organization operates today combating the War
on Terror and carrying out its other intelligence responsibilities.
We are the nation‘s first line of defense. We accomplish what others cannot
accomplish and go where others cannot go. We carry out our mission by: collecting
information that reveals the plans, intentions, and capabilities of our adversaries and
provides the basis for decision and action; producing timely analysis that provides
insight, warning, and opportunity to the President and decision makers charged with
protecting and advancing America‘s interests; conducting covert action at the
direction of the President to preempt threats or achieve US policy objectives. 1
This mission is reflective on how operations are being conducted today as the Agency
goes through the proper channels in the Intelligence Community and the Federal
Government. When looking back on the beginning of the CIA, however, the duties of the
Agency seemed to be more basic in intelligence gathering, analysis, and covert action.

1

Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Vision, Mission & Values, Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/ciavision-mission-values/index.html. Last Updated: June 2, 2008. Viewed on February 8, 2010.
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At the beginning of American operations in World War II, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan to become first the Coordinator of
Information and then the head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. 2 The
main purpose of this newly formed organization was to collect and then analyze strategic
information during the war. It was uncertain that if the OSS was going to be used further
after the war, or if it would be discarded altogether. It turned out that the latter occurred,
and the OSS was abolished along with many other wartime agencies and OSS functions
were transferred to the State and War Departments.3 This agency was the predecessor to
the CIA. Once WWII ended and the OSS was disbanded, however, it only took a couple
years for President Harry S. Truman to come to the realization that an intelligence
organization was needed despite the fact that there was no war occurring at the time.
The moment President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947 the
dynamic in Washington and the Intelligence Community changed forever as the CIA was
born.
The National Security Act of 1947 mandated a major reorganization of the foreign
policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government. The act created many
of the institutions that Presidents found useful when formulating and implementing
foreign policy, including the National Security Council (NSC)… The act also
established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which grew out of World War II
era Office of Strategic Services and small post-war intelligence organizations. The
CIA served as the primary civilian intelligence-gathering organization in the
government.4
This single act passed by President Truman placed the CIA in charge of the United
States‘ intelligence activities, which included ―coordinating the nation‘s intelligence
activities and correlating, evaluating and disseminating intelligence affecting national
2

Central Intelligence Agency, History of the CIA, Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-thecia/index.html. Last Updated: June 2, 2008. Viewed on February 8, 2010.
3
Ibid.
4
National Security Act of 1947, Available online at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus194550Intel/d223. Viewed on January 22, 2010.
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security.‖5 The DCI was in charge of overseeing all intelligence operations across the
United Sates.6 Despite many grievances being brought forth against the CIA over the
next fifty years after the act was signed into law, there was relatively little restructuring
until December 17, 2004.7 On this date, ―President George W. Bush signed the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act which restructured the Intelligence
Community by abolishing the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (DDCI) and creating the position of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (D/CIA).‖8 The act also created the position of Director of National
Intelligence (DNI). This person oversees the entire Intelligence Community, including
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
Along with the restructuring of the Intelligence Community, the discussion of
terrorism prevention is prevalent throughout the act. It will be discussed later in this
study as it is a vital component to the current discussion on the CIA‘s implementation of
enhanced interrogation techniques on terrorists and other enemy combatants. Once
again, it is important to note that the CIA is an independent agency and is not a branch of
the United States military. The D/CIA and other top officials report directly to the DNA,
the President, and other senior US policymakers involved with the intelligence
committees in the House and Senate. Historically, once approval for any covert or
intelligence operation is received, the D/CIA is in charge of the operations, budgets, and
personnel from the CIA‘s main headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

5

CIA, History of the CIA.
Ibid.
7
The Pike and Church Commissions during the 1970s occurred because the clandestine operations conducted by the
CIA were extremely unpopular. These operations were at the time the CIA was given the ability to do whatever it
needed to do to get the job done and maintain US national security. The Pike and Church commissions stopped the
leniency granted to the Agency as they put many restrictions on what it was capable of doing in the field.
8
CIA, History of the CIA.
6
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Since the CIA‘s main responsibility in preserving American national security is to
collect and analyze intelligence, the question that continuously comes up is how do they
go about doing that? As will be discussed later on, there are several methods that can be
utilized to obtain this vital intelligence. As the CIA duly notes, ―(T)ranslating foreign
newspaper and magazine articles and radio and television broadcasts provides opensource intelligence. Imagery satellites take pictures from space, and imagery analysts
write reports about what they see…Signals analysts work to decrypt coded messages sent
by other countries. Operations officers recruit foreigners to give information about their
countries.‖9 Finally, another method used to gather intelligence from potential foreign
threats is to engage in covert action at the President‘s direction; but most importantly, the
thing that has caused such a controversy and discredited the Agency is that this action
must be carried out in accordance with applicable law.
As the War on Terror moves forward and the memories of 9/11, the Fort Hood
shootings, the failed Christmas 2009 Detroit-airliner underwear-bombing, and the failed
Times Square truck bombing remain fresh in the minds of Americans, the CIA continues
to conduct its business. Interrogations are in use at places like Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib, but with the country‘s national security at stake and being the first line of
defense, it would seem that the Agency is going to take these risks and conduct these
enhanced methods in order to prevent future attacks on the country and its people. 10
Now, analyzing how the CIA carries out these interrogations, learning just what laws it
must adhere to on an international platform and what legal precedent there is for the
enhanced interrogation methods to be used are the meat of this study.
9

Central Intelligence Agency, What We Do, Available online at: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/todays-cia/what-wedo/index.html. Last Updated: June 2, 2008. Viewed on February 8, 2010.
10
Ibid.
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1.2

RESEARCH AIM
This study intends to analyze the legal reasoning that is applied to justify the CIA

employing enhanced interrogation techniques to combat the War on Terror. The purpose
of discussing these techniques acknowledges four given suppositions. First, given how
controversial enhanced interrogation methods are, there will be no consensus for or
against enhanced interrogation. Second, since there is no consensus, it will be important
to identify why these interrogation techniques are effective and essential. The physical
and emotional duress from extreme pain by some of these methods, however, cannot be
ignored. If those particular methods create such duress, then they will be considered
methods of torture and should be inappropriate to extract intelligence from combatants.
Third, this study expects to find that there is a tautological connection between
counterterrorism and the interrogation methods. Finally, although positive international
law permits the use of certain interrogation methods, there is an ever-growing negative
opinion of all borderline interrogation methods throughout the international community.

1.3

QUESTIONS TO BE ANALYZED


Is there a consistent basis for CIA practices?



If the CIA has arenas of operations and carries out operations in that jurisdiction
outside of American law, then why is the Justice Department the main component
in investigating the agency?



If people in the CIA are interrogating enemy combatants on and off the battlefield
in order to protect America and its people domestically and abroad, then why is

5

the Federal Government focusing on how they are carrying out these
interrogations?


Are there occasions that justify enhanced methods to gather intelligence, and if so,
what constitutes intelligence?



If the CIA or the military cannot hold these Guantanamo Bay prisoners or
interrogate them due to rules in the Geneva Conventions, then why can the US
bring these people into the country and treat them as citizens when they are not
even naturalized citizens?



How far can an intelligence agency or a military group go in regards to
interrogating spies, prisoners of war, terrorists, or other radical extremists?

1.4

LIMITATIONS
This study is going to consist primarily of Open Source normative and qualitative

data due to the inability to acquire substantial quantitative data. There are certain things
that occur in the CIA that are never leaked to the press or divulged to the public. This is
the main limitation of this research project. Court cases, national law, and international
treaties pertaining to interrogating enemy combatants will be consulted where
appropriate. The amount of declassified information is limited to protect national
security. If classified national secrets were available for everyone to see it could cause
disruption in the ebb and flow of the agency as well as putting Americans‘ lives at great
risk. So, only information obtained via sources that have been declassified and available
to all can be used in this project.

6

The positives and negatives of the CIA‘s methods need to be looked at and
understood as best as possible. One thing that must be understood, however, is that this
study is not trying to make a case for torture. What this study is going to attempt is
provide qualitative reasoning and legal justification in support of enhanced interrogation.
If some of these methods are revealed to be torture as the study unfolds, then they will be
deemed as such and not considered an acceptable method of interrogation.

1.5

METHOD AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The method chosen is an impartial approach to look at the interrogation/torture

issue from an objective standpoint. There are a multitude of events, court cases, treaties,
laws, and other supplements to assess this neutral framework to see what can and cannot
be considered acceptable methods and torture. The thesis will be broken down into four
parts:
1. Introduction and Development. Chapter One consists of the background of the
CIA and the main focus of this study. It concludes with the structure of the thesis.
Chapter Two will define key terminology that will be needed throughout this
paper. Chapter Three will move into the main historic and current events that
have brought this topic up into the forefront, and the significance each single
event has involving whether utilizing enhanced interrogation methods could be
related to torture or not. There will be some primary argumentation here, but it
will not be expanded until later. This is just to provide a backdrop to the legal
explanation of the methods the CIA employs.

7

2. Further Development and Comparisons. Chapter Four will develop the legal
argument to justify enhanced interrogation and also to look at it as torture. The
Geneva Conventions of 1949 that pertain to this matter will be discussed and
analyzed as well as the treaty from the UN Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Finally, the CIA‘s codes
of interrogation will be interpreted as well as comparing it to the codes of the
Army Field Manual.
3. Analysis and Justification. Chapter Five will delve into the factors for and against
interrogations being used at all. Looking at examples from Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo Bay with references to Michael Schmitt‘s paper on international law
and counterintelligence, it will be necessary to look at the methods that have
already been deemed torture and compare them to the ones that still receive
international approval. This will cover the cases that help support the CIA‘s
stance on interrogating enemy combatants as well as those opposed to their
methods. The declassified CIA memos, research by Richard Saccone and Marc
Thiessen, an interrogation document involving Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
(KSM), and other materials will be used to provide the bulk of the analysis for the
CIA using enhanced interrogation. On the other hand, prison incidents at Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, court testimonies, and other materials will be used
as the counterpunch to the main argument.
4. Looking at the Present and Future. Chapter Six will be the point where the study
will look at where the CIA is today on the subject. Looking at the controversies
that surround the Agency internationally and internally and any differences that

8

have been made to their operations are the focus of this section. Chapter Seven
will provide the concluding remarks of the study involving points from what was
learned. Finally, Chapter Eight will provide an analysis of implications regarding
the potential civilian trial of KSM and other al Qaeda terrorists as well as looking
at where the United States and the rest of the world goes from here regarding the
War on Terror.

2

DEFINING TERMS AND CONCEPTS

2.1

INTRODUCTION
Since this study is concerned with the CIA enhanced interrogation techniques to

combat the War on Terror it is critical to define some of the key terminology that will be
employed throughout this paper. The purpose here is not to start the debate nor begin to
analyze anything specific about the topic, but to understand the definitions of the terms
and start to consider the interpretations contained in the literature.
Critics against enhanced interrogation make the continuous claim that it violates
human rights and that its torture, but it does not seem that they truly know what enhanced
interrogation means. The same goes for the supporters of interrogation in regards to
torture. It is unclear if they have a firm grasp on the definition. Also, a general
understanding needs to be established in regards to human rights itself due to this being
the main charge when CIA personnel interrogate enemy combatants. Finally, the
interrogation techniques themselves that are in question need to be defined, such as:
waterboarding and extradition.

9

2.2

INTERROGATION AND TORTURE
Interrogation is used to acquire information about potential threats to one‘s

country or specific intelligence regarding enemy movements and strategies during war,
and it is permitted under the Laws of War.11 Many men and women in the military and
the intelligence field began to gather vital information to help win the War on Terror
dating back to September 11th, 2001.12 This is where events can become unclear.
Interrogations claimed to be torture to get the information from a detainee are neither
condoned in positive international law nor US law.
Torture as defined at the 1984 Convention against torture:
…means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. 13
This is a very thorough definition and understanding of torture, but this convention and
subsequent treaty only looked at one moral side of the issue and not the other. The other
side might be why government personnel would perform such acts that are considered
brutal and unnecessary. It can truly be a fine line between aggressive interrogation and
torture.
Steven Kleinman notes, ―(B)eyond this challenge is the Orwellian, repellant
nature of the topic itself—the pulling-out-of-fingernails connotation that the word
‗interrogation‘ carries. The extraction of information from unwilling subjects is
11

Human Intelligence Collector Operations: FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), (Washington DC: United States Army, September
6, 2006), p. 8.
12
The 9/11 Commission Report, (Washington DC: Soho Books, August 21, 2004), Chapter 12, Section 12.2, p. 365.
13
Hans Danelius, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
(United Nations: December 10, 1984), Article 1: Section 1.
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obviously an unpleasant matter.‖14 Interrogations do not start when the interrogators
begin questioning the prisoners in the holding rooms. The process begins before the
interrogators enter the room. They plan out a line of questioning to ask the prisoners, but
even before that, the prisoners have been worn down by days of sleep deprivation, severe
room temperature changes, flashing of bright lights, and other stimuli.
The above tactics used to wear down prisoners all cause physical and mental
strain, but it is simply a judgment call as to whether these tactics are legal or not. The
legal debate of the enhanced interrogation methods being considered torture has facts on
both sides, but at the same time, is very objective. Those in the CIA in favor of enhanced
interrogations will cite that the United States has not been attacked since 9/11 and that
due to the capture of numerous al Qaeda operatives, like KSM, many future terrorist plots
have been prevented. Those who view those interrogations as torture, like human rights
groups, the United Nations (UN), and others will note that the military, under CIA
oversight, treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba are
forms of torture. All the talk about torture has its precedent set from the Geneva
Conventions.
Inhumane treatment and torture is what caused the nations of the world to come
together to codify the Geneva Conventions. One of the many aspects of international
humanitarian law that the Geneva Conventions also focuses on is prisoners of war being
protected against violence and coercion to reveal information. The well cited Common
Article 3 points out, ―Captured combatants and civilians who find themselves under the
authority of the adverse party are entitled to respect for their lives, their dignity, their
14

Steven M. Kleinman, ―KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation Review: Obsessions of an Interrogator – Lessons
Learned and Avenues for Further Research,‖ in Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art, (Washington
DC: National Defense Intelligence College Press, December 2006), p. 130.
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personal rights and their political, religious and other convictions. They must be protected
against all acts of violence or reprisal. They are entitled to exchange news with their
families and receive aid. They must enjoy basic judicial guarantees.‖ 15 The New York
Times reported that, ―Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the Sept. 11
terror attacks, was water boarded 183 times in one month by CIA interrogators. The
Times and dozens of other outlets wrote that the CIA also water boarded senior Al Qaeda
member Abu Zubaydah 83 times, but Zubaydah himself, a close associate of Usama bin
Laden, told the Red Cross he was water boarded no more than 10 times.‖ 16 The varying
reports make it difficult to decipher who is telling the truth and who is not.

2.3

HUMAN RIGHTS
According to John Locke, every person had the basic rights of ―life, liberty, and

property.‖17 During the American Revolution, Thomas Jefferson altered it slightly to
make it life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Today, human rights have been defined
more specifically to include other necessities like food, shelter, and clothing. 18
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ―…human rights are
inherent to the human being and protect the individual at all times, in war and in peace.

15

Geneva Conventions of 1949, Third Geneva Convention: Prisoners of War, (United Nations: 1949), Common Article

3.
16

Joseph Abrams, ―Despite Reports, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Was not Waterboarded 183 Times,‖ FoxNews.com,
April 28, 2009, Available online at: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/28/despite-reports-khalid-sheikhmohammed-waterboarded-times/. Viewed on 1/22/10
17
John Locke and Peter Laslett, Two Treatises of Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
Second Treatise: Ch. 5, p. 10-11.
18
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, FDR: Selected Speeches of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, (St. Petersburg, Fla.: Red
and Black Publishers, 2010), p. 135.
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International humanitarian law, on the other hand, only applies in situations of armed
conflict, but goes hand in hand with international human rights laws.‖19
Every year the United Nations holds a council on human rights to discuss any
potential violations to the international laws by any countries. The UN bases the laws
that they make on human rights off of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
they adopted on December 10, 1948. There are two distinct lines in the declaration that
coincide with this study: ―Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of
person. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.‖20 There is no question that torture is morally wrong and violates human
rights, but when a country‘s national security is at stake, the moral implications might be
blurred or bent by zealous officials, or ill-trained lower echelon personnel.

2.4

INTERROGATION METHODS: WATERBOARDING AND
EXTRADITION
The CIA, FBI, and other federal agencies are supposed to adhere to the Army

Field Manual regarding proper interrogation procedures. An addition to the Army Field
Manual discussing these techniques was added in September of 2006. This is not a long
time ago but issues regarding the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, secret
facilities and bases run by the CIA, and the waterboarding interrogation technique have
been brought up more and more over the last year and a half. ―In accordance with the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the only interrogation approaches and techniques that
are authorized for use against any detainee, regardless of status or characterization, are
19

International Commission of the Red Cross, ―International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights,‖ Available online
at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_and_human_rights. Viewed on February 9, 2010.
20
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (United Nations: December 10, 1948), Articles 3 and 5.
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those authorized and listed in this Army Field Manual.‖21 According to the manual,
despite all the provisions, stipulations, and guidelines that have to be followed, any
changes ―of the approaches and techniques authorized and listed in this Army Field
Manual also require additional specified approval before implementation.‖ 22
All interrogation techniques that the CIA and military have relied upon in the War
on Terror have the potential to be considered forms of torture under the Geneva
Conventions. The Army Field Manual notes:
―While we do not stress the use of coercive techniques, we do want to make you
aware of them and the proper way to use them,‖ the CIA‘s KUBARK Interrogation
Manual's23 introduction states. The manual says such methods are justified when
subjects have been trained to resist noncoercive measures. Forms of coercion
explained in the interrogation manual include: Inflicting pain or the threat of pain:
The threat to inflict pain may trigger fears more damaging than the immediate
sensation of pain. In fact, most people underestimate their capacity to withstand
pain. 24
The fine line easily crossed occurs when the coercion referred to in the Manual becomes
the severe pain and suffering stated in the UN Convention. Out of all the techniques used
in interrogation, waterboarding has been the one that has human rights‘ activists domestic
and abroad, the media, and politicians inserting that the CIA is torturing prisoners.
For use in this study, waterboarding is a form of simulated drowning by placing
cellophane over the prisoner‘s face, which creates a gagging reflex. This is supposed to
be a quick interrogation method to last no longer than a couple of minutes in order to get
necessary information. Next, extraordinary rendition may be implemented when laws of
the country where the prisoner was apprehended do not permit enhanced techniques to be
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used on the person to extract necessary information. So the prisoner is transferred to
another country where those laws either do not exist or are not enforced. Then, that
country can implement those methods in order to get the information that the previous
country wanted to obtain.

3

EVENTS LEADING TO ENHANCED INTERROGATION/TORTURE

Robert Fein notes: ―In World War II, the United States military developed a secret
offensive program, called MIS-Y, designed to obtain intelligence from captured
adversaries. This ‗educing information‘ program (though it was not described as such at
the time) was designed to obtain intelligence from senior German officials, officers, and
scientists in U.S. custody.‖ 25 These military and intelligence entities have studied
effective information techniques for some time.

3.1

INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the significant events that brought the CIA‘s enhanced

interrogation techniques to the forefront, and the reasons given for why those techniques
are considered torture and why they are not. It creates the framework of the analysis for
the reasoning the Agency uses these methods to prosecute the War on Terror.
Section 3.2 will analyze the starting point of the CIA‘s use of different
interrogation techniques. Also, waterboarding used in the Vietnam War by American
military personnel, then condemned by military generals and considered a method of
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torture will be addressed.26 A brief look first at the development stages of the
interrogation process for the CIA will help in the understanding and analysis of why the
techniques are currently employed by the Agency. This will also provide a contrast to
how the military conducted interrogations for intelligence purposes. As in Vietnam, the
military used interrogations for defensive purposes while the CIA wanted to use those
same methods for offensive purposes in order to strike the enemy first. 27 The purpose
here is to provide analysis on a wider platform to expand on the definition of torture and
interrogation and establish the first significant event that caused the Agency to employ
enhanced interrogation methods on a large scale.
Section 3.3 will discuss the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the
Bojinka Plot in 1995.28 These two terrorist acts can be presented as support and
reasoning as to why the CIA decided to carry out interrogations of any terrorist members
whom it could apprehend during covert missions. Those events were only the precursor
to what al Qaeda had planned, however, and it would set in motion the logic for later
attacks and the United States entering the War on Terror.29
Section 3.4 discusses how 9/11, the most devastating attack to occur on American
soil30, impacted the CIA and how it conducts its covert operations including its
interrogations of terrorists and other enemy combatants. Shortly after the events of 9/11
occurred the United States embarked on what would be called the War on Terror. This is
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where the most in-depth analysis will start for the rest of this study as the CIA‘s enhanced
methods have come under fire more and more as the war progresses.
Section 3.5 will discuss and analyze the two controversial sites where the CIA
employed their enhanced interrogation methods on enemy combatants; Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba.31 Also, this will be the section where
the hypothesis of this paper will be developed for analysis. The question developed
therein is why the CIA decided to employ enhanced interrogation techniques to combat
the War on Terror.
Are waterboarding and other enhanced techniques illegal as declared by Geneva
and the Convention against Torture? Does the Agency‘s resolve grow stronger and more
defiant to push the proverbial envelope to extract intelligence from enemy combatants by
their enhanced methods? Does former President George W. Bush and others have it right
when they say that ―the Agency‘s enhanced interrogation program, which included
controversial techniques such as waterboarding, was legal and garnered valuable
information that prevented terrorist attacks?‖32

3.2

ORIGINS OF CIA’S INTERROGATION PROGRAM AND VIETNAM

3.2.1 ORIGINS OF CIA’S INTERROGATION PROGRAM
Though American interrogations to extract intelligence from prisoners have taken
place for many years, the CIA has only been around officially for slightly over half a
century. The CIA only began developing ways to interrogate prisoners throughout the
31
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1950s and 1960s. 33 It was not until the early 1960s, like the Army Field Manual outlining
proper interrogation techniques for the military, did the CIA establish an interrogation
manual of their own. The manual is entitled the KUBARK (a cryptonym for the CIA)
Counterintelligence Interrogation Manual and was created in July of 1963 and publicly
released in the late 1990s.34 The primary focus of this manual was to establish the
techniques that the Agency would use when interrogating prisoners of war. Also publicly
released in the late 1990s was the CIA‘s updated manual that was written in 1983. It is
entitled the Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual.35
During its early years, the CIA conducted research and studies regarding which
techniques would be most effective in extracting the most intelligence from a certain
individual. ―The CIA sponsored studies designed to explore how drugs (LSD, for
example), sensory deprivation, and hypnosis might be used as techniques to elicit
information.‖36 The KUBARK manual does not sugarcoat any of the reasons for
interrogating prisoners of war and explains the Agency‘s interpretation of what an
interrogation is and what is entailed during the process. ―There is nothing mysterious
about interrogation. It consists of no more than obtaining needed information through
responses to questions…But sound interrogation nevertheless rests upon knowledge of
the subject matter and on certain broad principles, chiefly psychological, which are not
hard to understand.‖37
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The CIA has been accused of torturing prisoners in order to get the intelligence
they need to help American national security. 38 When the interrogation program was
developed and updated, however, the Agency condemned any type of torture being used
even if useful intelligence could be obtained. ―The use of force, mental torture, threats,
insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind as an aid to
interrogation is prohibited by law, both international and domestic; it is neither
authorized nor condoned.‖39 It seems that the Agency made it quite clear in their
manuals that any form of torture would not be tolerated and could result in legal
ramifications. Both manuals have sections that outline proper procedures for conducting
interrogations as well as when or if to use coercive methods. In that regard, proper
authorization is required before an interrogator can even begin to think about using
coercive measures.
―Use of force is a poor technique, yields unreliable results, may damage
subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to say what he thinks the
interrogator wants to hear. Additionally, the use of force will probably result in adverse
publicity and/or legal action against the interrogator (et. al) when the source is
released.‖40 ―For both ethical and pragmatic reasons no interrogator may take upon
himself the unilateral responsibility for using coercive methods. Concealing from the
interrogator‘s superiors intent to resort to coercion, or its unapproved employment, does
not protect them. It places them, and KUBARK, in unconsidered jeopardy.‖ 41 So, the
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CIA has never had the intention to use torture or inflict pain on the people from whom
they attempt to extract intelligence. 42 The Agency knew that in order to remain behind
the scenes and maintain their level of anonymity and limited public recognition;
interrogators had to make sure that their interrogations could not bring national and
international controversy their way. As time progressed and technology advanced with
radio, television, and computers, however, the Agency‘s secrets were not as secret
anymore as their interrogation methods seemed to first come to light during the Vietnam
War. 43

3.2.2 VIETNAM WAR
After being researched and developed in the ‗50s and ‗60s, the CIA evolved their
interrogation. The CIA precursor, the OSS, during World War II, developed an
interrogation process which followed the military‘s. One could consider this the first
generation of the interrogation of enemy combatants. Then the CIA evolved and
developed their own process which was used in Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War. That
stage can be considered the second generation of interrogating enemy combatants.
During this time, the Pike and Church Commissions of the 1970s condemned what the
CIA carried out as the Agency did not seem to have any borders or boundaries. Finally,
9/11 and the War on Terror has forced the Agency to move into a third generation of
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interrogations as they question enemy combatants in secret prisons and facilities using
enhanced techniques. 44
When the United States entered Vietnam, the Agency was not sure what rule
exactly they would end up playing. It was only in 1963 when George Allen, a senior
intelligence expert on Vietnam for the newly formed Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
took a job with the Agency that the CIA‘s role became clear. Their main job was to
provide support to the military and any necessary intelligence on the Viet Cong. ―His
(Allen‘s) CIA team was given access to MACV (U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam) and ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) intelligence, made field
inspections to the different U.S. military zones countrywide, pushed for coordinated
intelligence efforts such as interrogation centers, and even briefed William Colby during
the CIA director‘s visit to Saigon.‖ 45 The controversy surrounding the CIA‘s
interrogation methods began with Vietnam as waterboarding became a perceived and
well-documented technique there. ―Water boarding was designated as illegal by U.S.
generals in Vietnam 40 years ago. A photograph that appeared in The Washington Post
of a U.S. soldier involved in waterboarding a North Vietnamese prisoner in 1968 led to
that soldier's severe punishment.‖46
This technique was altered slightly from the CIA‘s KUBARK interrogation
manual. In the manual, ―subjects were suspended in tanks of water wearing blackout
masks that allowed for breathing. Within hours, the subjects felt tension and so-called
environmental anxiety. ‗Providing relief for growing discomfort, the questioner assumes
44
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a benevolent role,‘ the manual states.‖47 In Vietnam, however, the United States military
took the waterboarding technique in a slightly different direction. ―On Jan. 21, 1968, a
photograph of a U.S. soldier supervising the questioning of a captured North Vietnamese
soldier who is being held down as water was poured on his face while his nose and mouth
were covered by a cloth. The picture, taken four days earlier near Da Nang, had a caption
that said the technique induced ‗a flooding sense of suffocation and drowning, meant to
make him talk.‘‖48
Once American military leaders declared that waterboarding was illegal, and any
use of it could be subjected to a court martial, it would be logical that waterboarding
would not be used anymore and the controversy would go away. The CIA and other
covert operations units in the military thought differently. ―In the post-Vietnam period,
the Navy SEALs and some Army Special Forces used a form of waterboarding with
trainees to prepare them to resist interrogation if captured. The waterboarding proved so
successful in breaking their will they stopped using it because it hurt morale.‖49 As will
be discussed in the next few sections, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1995
Bojinka Plot, and 9/11 changed how the CIA went about conducting their interrogations
of prisoners. The Agency still went through the same authorized channels and still
followed the two manuals, but the terrorists who were captured post-9/11 were more
defiant and challenging to extract useful information.50 It seemed that more coercive
methods were needed due to how emboldened the terrorists had become.
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3.3

FIRST BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND BOJINKA
PLOT

3.3.1 1993 BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER
The first bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) was no 9/11, but it went a
long way in putting Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda‘s names out there as threats to
American national security. ―On February 26, 1993, a huge bomb went off in the parking
garage of the WTC. It was not a suicide bombing as the terrorists had parked a truck
bomb in the garage and used a timing device to set it off. It caused damage seven stories
up into the towers killing six people and wounding over a thousand. The FBI said it was
an absolute miracle that more people were not killed.‖51
Once Langley was debriefed on the situation, they went into intelligence
gathering and analysis mode to see what they could have missed in their intelligence and
what sources they could look into to uncover the source of the attacks.52 Once the WTC
was hit for the first time, the CIA would never be the same. Covert actions needed to
occur in order for the Agency to live up to their mission of being the nation‘s first line of
defense. Interrogations needed to take place as soon as reliable information came to the
Agency involving the terrorists responsible for the attack. At the same time, CIA leaders
knew that they had to go through the proper channels before anything could be carried
out. ―During the 1990s, tension sometimes arose, as it did in the effort against al Qaeda,
between policymakers who wanted the CIA to undertake more aggressive covert action

51
52

The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 3, Section 3.1, p. 71.
Ibid., p. 71.

23

and wary CIA leaders who counseled prudence and making sure that the legal basis and
presidential authorization for their actions were undeniably clear.‖ 53
The 9/11 Commission observed that ―…in 1996, the CIA set up a special unit of a
dozen officers to analyze intelligence and plan operations against Bin Laden.‖54
Interrogations were occurring to obtain the intelligence on Bin Laden by capturing
associates of the terrorist leader. KSM and Ramzi Yousef came onto the scene at this
time admitting they also had a hand in 9/11 like Bin Laden. Luckily, the plot set up in
the Philippines in 1995 was foiled, and the CIA had yet another major terrorist to track
and gather intelligence. ―KSM first came to the attention of the U.S. law enforcement as
a result of his cameo role in the first World Trade Center bombing…Yousef‘s instant
notoriety as the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing inspired KSM to
become involved in planning attacks against the United States.‖55

3.3.2 1995 BOJINKA “BOOM” PLOT
The Bojinka (Arabic for boom) Plot was supposed to occur in the Pacific in 1995
with the bombing of 12 U.S. commercial airliners. KSM and Yousef based their
operations in the Philippines. This planned attack was the first time KSM had a hand in
organizing an operation. Yousef and KSM acquired chemicals and timers to create the
bombs as well as scouted where those 12 airliners were departing, where they had
layovers, and where their final destinations were in the United States. The terrorists did
not spend their entire time in the Philippines; they both left to go back to the Middle East
at certain periods of time. ―Late in 1994, Yousef returned to Manila and successfully
53
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tested the digital watch timer he had invented, bombing a movie theater and a Philippine
Airlines flight en route to Tokyo.‖56
At this point the CIA was tracking both KSM and Yousef, and the Agency tipped
off the Philippine authorities that Yousef was behind the bombing. The Agency also
mentioned that the attacks might not be over, and that they should go investigate. So,
early in 1995, ―the plot unraveled after the Philippines authorities discovered Yousef‘s
bomb-making operation in Manila, but by that time, KSM was safely back at his
government job in Qatar. Yousef attempted to follow through on the cargo carriers plan,
but he was arrested in Islamabad by Pakistani authorities on February 7, 1995, after an
accomplice turned him in.‖57 While this plot was being foiled, the Agency knew that al
Qaeda was well financed, but at the time did not know how their finances were
networked. ―Enemy combatants, including al Qaeda, came to the forefront in the 1990s
when the terrorist group attacked the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7,
1998, and then later attacked the USS Cole on October 12, 2000 in the Yemeni port of
Aden.‖58 These attacks marked the eruption of the operational ability of al Qaeda. The
Agency knew it had to step up its efforts in the interrogations of captured al Qaeda
members, but when September 11, 2001 occurred, it changed their plans yet again.

3.4 9/11
September 11, 2001 is a day that will be remembered by all and a day that set into
motion the start of a counter-offensive against not just Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda,
but all terrorism. ―On September 11, 2001, terrorists seized control of four passenger
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aircraft in the United States. Two were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City, a third was flown into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. and
the fourth crashed in Pennsylvania following a heroic attempt by passengers to regain
control from the highjackers. Roughly 3,000 people of over 80 nationalities perished.‖ 59
It was not until after those four planes crashed in New York, Washington, and
Pennsylvania did the CIA learn that KSM was the mastermind behind the attacks. It was
not until after thousands of United States‘ citizens were announced dead due to 9/11 that
the CIA learned that Bin Laden and al Qaeda gave KSM the green light to carry out the
operation. ―Bin Laden, apparently at Atef‘s urging, finally decided to give KSM the
green light for the 9/11 operations sometime in late 1998 or early 1999.‖ 60 It was only
after the attacks that it was discovered that KSM wanted to expand 9/11 even further and
attack Jewish sites and financial institutions in New York, but although Bin Laden liked
the idea, he wanted KSM to focus solely on the initial operation. 61 After the WTC came
crumbling to the ground, a huge hole was left in the outer rings of the Pentagon, and a
large crater remained in the fields of Pennsylvania, President Bush stated that those
responsible would pay.
How did the United States receive all this information about the specific details of
9/11 and the Bojinka Plot? Yes, it was documented in the 9/11 Commission, but where
did the Commission obtain the information? Simply put, the CIA captured KSM on
March 1, 2003 and interrogated him at a secret CIA facility. They used enhanced
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interrogations on him, including waterboarding, and he began describing in full detail the
plots of 9/11 as well as many other attacks al Qaeda was planning on America.
―For its part, Congress passed a joint resolution that authorized the President to
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.‖62 9/11 marked the day where President Bush, after receiving
approval by Congress, authorized the CIA to find those responsible in the attacks.63 This
leads to what the CIA has been doing since 9/11: capturing terrorists and interrogating
them about plots against America and its allies at secret facilities as well as highly
controversial prisons at Abu Ghraib, Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

3.5

ABU GHRAIB AND GUANTANAMO BAY

3.5.1 ABU GHRAIB
Torture is cruel and unusual punishment and has no place in any type of
interrogation. The CIA knows this and knows that it is illegal domestically and
internationally. The Agency always walks that fine line between what is legal and moral
to what is reprehensible. It is not as if the Agency does this out of personal satisfaction
or for political reasons, but it always acts on what it feels is right for the Agency and for
the country‘s national security. Abu Ghraib in Iraq not only became an international
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scandal regarding torture against Iraqi prisoners, but it supposedly involved U.S. military
personnel implementing methods they had been taught by the CIA.64
Even as late as July, the Army's inspector general, Paul Mikolashek, claimed that
‗these abuses should be viewed as what they are: unauthorized actions taken by a
few individuals.‘ A month later, after human rights groups pointed to evidence of
much wider culpability, two government reports - one released by an Army panel
chaired by Major Gen. George Fay, the other by a commission headed by former
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger - confirmed what many already sensed: that
the abuse went far beyond the seven arrested MPs.65
The alleged abuse of the prisoners at the Iraqi detention facility escalated when The
Washington Post leaked photos of prisoners not being treated in a manner acceptable
under United States law or under Geneva.
Major General George R. Fay was appointed to conduct an investigation into the
prison abuses at Abu Ghraib. His report added to the growing debate regarding the War
on Terror, especially the military and the CIA‘s involvement in it to obtain intelligence
from captured combatants. His report mentioned that ―When hostilities were declared
over, US forces had control of only 600 Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) and Iraqi
criminals...The primary causes (of abuse) are misconduct (ranging from inhumane to
sadistic) by a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians, a lack of discipline on
the part of the leaders and Soldiers of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (MI
BDE).‖66
This report caught national media attention for months as reporters of the
National Catholic Reporter, James Hodge and Linda Cooper, wanted the nation to know
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the specifics of the abuses that the Fay Report revealed. ―It (Fay Report) found dozens of
cases of abusive treatment of prisoners, including stripping them naked and subjecting
them to intense heat or cold or holding them in stress positions for long periods of time.
The most graphic revelation was of a game between two teams of dog handlers who used
their animals to try to induce involuntary bowel movements in terrified teenage boys.‖67
What the report does not state was how overcrowded and underemployed the prison was
and how mismanaged it was. Also, personnel at the prison did not have accurate records
documenting more than half of the prisoners that were detained there. Dr. Saccone
confirms this by stating, ―Unphased by my revelation, they (American advisors at Abu
Ghraib) confided that the Iraqi authorities only really kept an accurate count of about
40% of the prisoners.‖68
Marc Thiessen goes on further to explain the panel that was established to
investigate the prisoner abuses and the guilty parties involved. ―Indeed, the Independent
Panel (set up by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to investigate alleged prisoner
abuse/torture at CIA secret sites, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay) found that one of
the principal reasons for the abuses at Abu Ghraib was the fact that Abu Ghraib was
seriously overcrowded (7,000 detainees), under-resourced (guard force of just ninety
MPs), under continual attack.‖69 Not to mention, the report did not appear to directly
implicate the CIA as one of the guilty parties to the prisoner abuse. The Fay Report
seemed to just implicate both civilian and active military personnel only.
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Senator Kerry and other political leaders on Capitol Hill felt that it was not just
the military that should be held culpable in this situation, but also the CIA and civilian
leaders, and specifically the Bush Administration. Things got worse for the Agency and
the Administration when the CBS News program, 60 Minutes, on April 28, 2004,
displayed photos of tortured prisoners at Abu Ghraib by military and CIA ghost
personnel that were obtained by the Washington Post. Less than a month later, the paper
released the photos via their website. 70 What happened in those photos had nothing to do
with CIA interrogations, military interrogations, or interrogations of any sort. None of
the pictured abuses at Abu Ghraib, in the words of one official investigation, ‗bear any
resemblance to approved policies at any level in any theater.‘71 Mr. Thiessen‘s account
seems to reflect another person‘s account on the prison as he got to see firsthand what
occurred on a daily basis at the infamous prison.
Interrogators will try to ascertain further information such as how he (a prisoner)
was selected for the training, how he made his way to Afghanistan, which countries
he traveled through, who assisted him, what travel documents were used, were any
documents forged, how and when did he obtain them, can he identify any persons
attending training at the same time, can he identify persons working at the camp,
can he describe the training curriculum, what weapons did he learn to use, what
bomb making techniques, and who taught them…Strategic information can take
months to acquire and may lead to other lines of questioning developed from the
detainee‘s answers. 72
Dr. Saccone was able to experience the daily occurrences at the prison, while Mr.
Thiessen learned about those occurrences via classified CIA and military documents due
to his status as presidential aide and speechwriter for President Bush.
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By the time one of the major leaders in the al Qaeda organization, Abu Faraj alLibbi (third in command only behind Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri) was
captured, Abu Ghraib was permanently cemented in the world‘s mind. Senators John
McCain, Lindsey Graham, and John Warner in late 2005 fought to pass the Detainee
Treatment Act. In short, this bill restricted how interrogations of enemy combatants
could be conducted. So, once the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, and the CIA had the third in
command of al Qaeda detained, they were limited in what they could do to interrogate
him and extract vital information from him.
―The entire world knew about Abu Ghraib; but few knew about the capture of alLibbi, the vital intelligence he possessed, or the damage that could be done by restricting
the ability of the CIA to get that information. And the damage was immediate and
lasting. Once enhanced interrogation techniques could not be used, al-Libbi had no
incentive to talk.‖73 That legislation suspended the CIA interrogation program for
approximately two years. Director of National Intelligence Admiral Mike McConnell
wanted the CIA program to continue, but he needed sound logic to present to Congress in
light of the Detainee Treatment Act. So, after reviewing the legal reasoning provided by
the Justice Department from 2002 to 2004 authorizing the use of enhanced techniques, he
was granted authorization to sign papers permitting the Agency to continue utilizing the
program. 74
There is no doubt that the abuses that some of the prisoners took at Abu Ghraib
were not only unnecessary but illegal. The military police (MPs) at Abu Ghraib were
under direct orders from the Pentagon to treat the prisoners there like other prisoners of

73
74

Marc A. Thiessen, p. 41.
Ibid., p. 118.

31

war under the Geneva Conventions. ―The aberrant behavior on the night shift in Cell
Block 1 at Abu Ghraib would have been avoided with proper training, leadership, and
oversight. It faulted the ‗predilections of the noncommissioned officers in charge,‘ and
stated, ‗had these noncommissioned officers behaved more like those on the day shift,
these acts, which one participant described as just for the fun of it, would not have taken
place.‘‖75
Unfortunately, the damage that Abu Ghraib did to the public image of the United
States and its military/intelligence organizations did not help in convincing politicians
that enhanced interrogations should continue unchanged. It is true that Admiral
McConnell did reinstate the CIA program, but waterboarding was one of the techniques
that was not among the approved techniques. ―Abu Ghraib created a disadvantage for the
United States. My view of the political rationale for the decision (removal of
waterboarding as a technique under the CIA interrogation program) was it regained what
was lost at Abu Ghraib, but that it gave away a technique that might be vital to the
protection of Americans and American interests.‖76 When Abu Ghraib is looked at in the
long run, there has been no empirical evidence of the CIA being linked to that abuse and
that interrogations were involved to justify the abuse.
As Mr. Thiessen put it, ―(C)ritics charge that the CIA program was part of a wider
policy of abuse that began at CIA black sites and spread to Guantanamo Bay,
Afghanistan, and Iraq—and led directly to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. And they charge
that coercive interrogations are immoral and unnecessary—and that in the war on terror
we can remain safe while avoiding the difficult choices that create tension between our
75

Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention Operations,
(Arlington, VA: William S. Hein & Company, January 30, 2005), p. 13.
76
Marc A. Thiessen, p. 235.

32

values and our security.‖ 77 If Abu Ghraib was not bad enough for the Agency, the Bush
Administration, and the military, controversy did not fade away when information was
leaked about abuse and torture being carried out at the Cuban prison site, Guantanamo
Bay.

3.5.2 GUANTANAMO BAY
Abu Ghraib has certainly been difficult and trying on the CIA and the United
States as a whole, but the controversy that has surrounded Guantanamo Bay for the last
couple of years could quite possibly give the Iraqi prison a run for its money. ―Since the
counter-terrorism operations began, controversy has surfaced regarding a number of legal
issues. Most notable among these have been the detention, treatment and proposed
prosecution of the detainees held at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay.‖ 78 KSM was
moved to this facility from CIA custody along with a few other high end al Qaeda
detainees, including a couple more that were involved in the planning, financing, and
execution of 9/11. Guantanamo was where KSM and other detainees began claiming that
torture had been used against them, including waterboarding, and that their overall
treatment was poor. Because of this, during his first week in office, President Obama
decided to take quick action.
He issued Executive Order 13491 on January 22, 2009, which discontinued the
CIA enhanced interrogation program and closed CIA secret facilities and bases in the
Middle East as well as in different places around the world where illegal actions and
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harsh treatments of prisoners had been taking place.79 Also that same day, the extremely
controversial military base, Guantanamo Bay, was placed on Executive Order 13492 to
be closed down within a year due to its ―cruel and unusual punishment to the prisoners
that are detained there as well as the wrongful imprisonment of some of the people at the
facility.‖80 Fortunately for the CIA, these executive orders did not place another ban on
their interrogation program, but it will require the Agency as well as all other intelligence
organizations and the military to adhere to the interrogation process in the Army Field
Manual. That manual will be discussed in the next chapter.
There are two points to criticize with Executive Orders 13491 and 13492 by
President Obama. First, the closing of Guantanamo Bay will and has forced the United
States and other countries to find places to transfer these detainees, many of them high
level terrorists that included KSM, and then decide whether to try them in a civilian
criminal court or in a military tribunal. That will be talked about in later chapters.
Second, having to follow the Army Field Manual’s interrogation program to the letter
forces the CIA to treat these detainees as military prisoners of war (POWs) and hinders
the Agency‘s ability to properly extract vital intelligence from them. ―The rule would
prevent trained interrogators at the CIA from using lawful interrogation techniques
against terrorists who have been trained to withstand Army Field Manual Techniques.‖81
Critics of the detention facility have claimed that Guantanamo (Gitmo) has
become a recruiting tool for terrorism, specifically for al Qaeda. ―Blair (Director of
National Intelligence Dennis Blair) responded that Guantanamo has become a major
79
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recruiting tool for al Qaeda, setting off an exchange with Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah
that concluded with Blair saying: ‗Guantanamo has achieved a sort of mythic quality that
helps al Qaeda.‘‖82
In the absence of any hard information in the document - including in particular the
interrogation logs that may have been kept - it serves as a timely reminder that those
who seek to justify abuse and torture are dependent on a culture of secrecy, and on
the publication of selective extracts of partial and (most likely) self-serving views.
Even if these techniques were effective, they were illegal and they were wrong.
Most likely they served only to extend the conflict, to create a recruiting tool for
those on whom they were used, as has happened more recently with Guantanamo
and Abu Ghraib. 83
Due to the fact that so many al Qaeda operatives and other terrorist detainees have been
there, however, Democrats opposed to enhanced interrogation are also against President
Obama‘s decision to close the facility within a year of signing Executive Order 13492
due to the uncertainty of where the detainees would be transferred. ―Senate Democrats
rejected President Obama's request for funding to close the Guantanamo Bay prison and
vowed to withhold federal dollars until the president decides the fate of the facility's 240
detainees.‖84 These critics have realized that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay have
unprecedented access to U.S. legal counsel, representation by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), and the ability to enter into U.S. courts like U.S. citizens. 85
The two biggest unknowns about the Gitmo facility are exactly how many
detainees are there and what treatment/interrogations have been thrust upon them.
―Enhanced interrogation techniques were applied to a small number of individuals. Of
82
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the tens of thousands captured in the War on Terror, fewer than 800 combatants were
moved to Guantanamo Bay for detention and interrogation. Of these, only two
individuals at Guantanamo had any special interrogation plans approved for them—and
the techniques used by military interrogators were far less coercive than the techniques
used by the CIA.‖86 Not only were there misconceptions that the detainees at
Guantanamo were being treated abusively, but there were also claims that there were
people imprisoned at Gitmo that were just considered common criminals to be taught a
lesson at the hardened facility. ―While there were some individuals who were taken to
Guantanamo who did not belong there, and subsequently released, the vast majority held
at the facility were not common criminals or bystanders who were accidentally arrested.
They were dangerous terrorists who had made it their life‘s mission to kill Americans or
America‘s allies—and, if set free, would immediately return to fulfilling that mission (as
some did).‖87
Mr. Thiessen helped to write President Bush‘s address regarding Guantanamo
Bay, the transfer of KSM and other al Qaeda members to the facility, and the CIA‘s
enhanced interrogation program. This was in an attempt to push Congress into passing
legislation to allow military commissions to begin as soon as possible to try KSM and the
others. The address did work because the president signed the Military Commissions Act
on October 17, 2006 a month after his September 6th address.88 The legislation also
allowed the CIA to continue with its interrogation program, ―This bill provides legal
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protections that ensure our military and intelligence personnel will not have to fear
lawsuits filed by terrorists simply for doing their jobs.‖ 89
The one question that should be asked is if the released detainees of Gitmo were
ill-treated so horribly then why would they potentially risk receiving more of the same
treatment if captured again after proceeding to go back to their terrorist ways? ―In
January, the Pentagon reported that as of December 2008 at least 60 former Guantanamo
detainees who were released from the facility have returned to terrorism. (Gitmo has held
nearly 800 enemy combatants since 2002; more than 500 have been released so far.)‖ 90
These numbers, however, have not stopped critics from making the same claims that
prisoners at Guantanamo Bay continue to be mistreated and tortured. ―Human rights
groups and civil liberties advocates who beat the drum to try them or set them free
continue to rail against Gitmo, affecting international perceptions of the United States
across the globe.‖91 By closing Guantanamo and pronouncing abuse of detainees there,
this seems to be hurting the fight against terrorism more so than it is trying to strengthen
and reestablish a domestic and international high morality by the United States.
―Detainees in American custody—particularly those at Guantanamo Bay—have
been treated humanely, in a manner that recognizes their inherent dignity as human
beings. They are well fed, given time to exercise, and provided with opportunities to
practice their faith. Indeed, they are treated better than criminals held in domestic prisons
in the United States and the detention centers of Europe.‖92 The importance here is to
understand that Guantanamo Bay was exploited in public relations campaigns as being a
89
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facility where detainees were mistreated and tortured. 93 It has been refuted with
evidence, however, that they are treated humanely and though the CIA and military
interrogate them, it is for national security due to the intelligence the detainees possess. 94
Guantanamo Bay was the location where KSM divulged the 2006 airlines plot
where al Qaeda members were planning on carrying out another Bojinka-style attack
about a month before the five-year anniversary of 9/11. The plot was to hijack seven
commercial planes and blow them up over the Atlantic Ocean. KSM gave up this
information after being waterboarded for just under two minutes. 95 This was just a
fraction of what KSM told the interrogators and only one half of refuting the myth of
abuse at the facility. The other half occurred when Guantanamo got particularly high
marks in Admiral Albert Church‘s report. ―At GTMO, where there have been over
24,000 interrogation sessions since the beginning of internment operations (2002), there
are only three cases of closed, substantiated interrogation related abuse, all consisting of
minor assaults in which…interrogators exceeded the bounds of approved interrogation
policy.‖96 Even now in 2011, President Obama has kept Guantanamo Bay open and has
decided to move forward with military tribunals of detainees at the facility as opposed to
civilian trials.
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4

RULES OF INTERROGATION

4.1

INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the discussion will become more concrete regarding the

interrogation process of the intelligence and military communities. The rules of
interrogation will be looked at and analyzed. In section 4.2, the Geneva Conventions will
be looked at in more detail than before to achieve a better understanding of the guidelines
for prisoner treatment and intelligence extraction.
Section 4.3 will go over the UN‘s Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It will reflect the Geneva Conventions
stance on prisoner treatment and demonstrate the fine line that the CIA and military walk
in their interrogations.
Section 4.4 will discuss the Army Field Manual, and its guidelines to conducting
proper interrogations to extract intelligence from prisoners of war. This manual is the
barometer that President Obama and his administration set when they first entered office
for intelligence and military personnel to follow when conducting interrogations.97
Section 4.5 will revisit the CIA‘s laws when regarding their interrogation program
and also look at the more specific interrogation methods the Agency employs. The
KUBARK Manual and the Human Resource Exploitation Manual will also be revisited to
further evaluate the CIA‘s interrogation program.

4.2

GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Due to the Geneva Conventions that were restated in 1949, countries in general

and the CIA and the United States military in particular, were forced to adhere to stricter
97
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rules and regulations regarding interrogating prisoners and what means and lengths they
could go to in order to get information out of those prisoners. ―The Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols are international treaties that contain the most important
rules limiting the barbarity of war. They protect people who do not take part in the
fighting (civilians, medics, aid workers) and those who can no longer fight (wounded,
sick and shipwrecked troops, prisoners of war).‖98 Since these laws are international
treaties, all states and non-actors are bound to these treaties if they are ever to come into
conflict with one another or within themselves. 99 These treaties have a worldwide
acceptance and must be treated as law. It is very difficult for a nation to work its way
around the language of the treaties. One of the aspects of international humanitarian law
that the Geneva Conventions heavily focuses on is the importance of prisoners of war
being protected against violence and coercion to reveal information.
This is one of the main items that nations like the United States and other military
and intelligence powers have the most difficulty avoiding. ―Captured combatants and
civilians who find themselves under the authority of the adverse party are entitled to
respect for their lives, their dignity, their personal rights and their political, religious and
other convictions. They must be protected against all acts of violence or reprisal. They
are entitled to exchange news with their families and receive aid. They must enjoy basic
judicial guarantees.‖100 Political, military, and intelligence leaders alike have all put their
opinions in regarding proper interrogation techniques and walking the proverbial fine line
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of crossing over to torture.101 The Associated Press notes, ―Sen. Richard Durbin, D-Ill.
said some of the approved enhanced techniques ‗go far beyond the Geneva Convention,‘
a reference to international rules governing the treatment of prisoners of war.‖ 102 The
overall background and essence of what the Geneva Conventions mean is known, but the
actual treaties and protocols themselves have to be broken down to get a better idea of
what the international community deems as permissible interrogation. Moreover, one can
only assume that full knowledge of the accords is hardly likely for all the enemy
combatants and soldiers in the world.
The very first Convention took place at the Hague in 1907 to 1908 and primarily
dealt with the care of wounded soldiers whether in the battlefield or out at sea, and
included certain weapons prohibitions. The wounded needed to be properly taken care of
and not harmed further in any physical, mental, or emotional way. 103 These notions were
reiterated after the first World War Convention at Geneva. It was then that the notions of
prisoners of war and interrogation techniques leading to gruesome and unnecessary
torture were also addressed. An interesting note to this portion of the Convention process
was that the members of the treaty process included language that stated ―these
conventions must be upheld during times of war between two of the signing parties of
this convention, even if the conflict is not recognized by one side.‖ 104 If this is correct,
then the United States, Great Britain, and the other Coalition Forces fighting in the War
on Terror must extend their protection to al Qaeda combatants, and al Qaeda may not be
obliged to follow them in turn, since they are not state actors. Those radical terrorist
101
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groups opposing them in Iraq and Afghanistan need to adhere to the Conventions,
however, because their states‘ signatures are on the papers of the treaties. Consequently,
they are obliged to follow suit given it seems clear that non-state groups like al Qaeda do
not care about international law thus distinction may be irrelevant.
To this point, they have not adhered to the Geneva Conventions. Early War on
Terror operations indicated when terrorists captured, not military personnel, but foreign
civilians (journalists from the United States) and local civilians, they were beheaded on
camera. There was no application of the law of war to these prisoners. There is no
guarantee that the prisoners were interrogated about anything. It is pure speculation that
the terrorists had interrogated them and abused them, then killed them or if they just
killed them to prove a point to the Coalition forces. This is one of the main reasons why
the debate of enhanced interrogation is so prominent.105 On one hand, the United States
is obligated under the Geneva Conventions to grant captured individuals, during a period
of war, human rights and proper treatment. On the other hand, terrorists of al Qaeda and
other terror cells do not adhere to these laws. So, if they do not adhere to these laws when
they have captured civilian and military personnel, then why do the CIA and the military
have to adhere to the rules?
There has been much debate and legal dispute about the status of captured terrorists
and whether they have combatant rights under the Geneva Convention, which
would preclude torture and humiliating treatment. By mid-2008, there were several
official and conflicting views, including a Supreme Court decision ruling that
detainees had Geneva Convention rights and a new executive order that would
allow the resumption of detention and interrogation as defined by the DCIA and
compliant with the convention.106
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The next aspect of the third Geneva Convention treaty—revisited after World
War II—confirmed what the world community felt was proper interrogation techniques,
what torture was, and what was proper treatment of prisoners.
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are
and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to
the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c)
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 107
So according to this aspect of the Conventions, all countries who have signed onto and
agreed to the terms of the Conventions cannot in any way, or under any circumstances,
mistreat or abuse the captives or prisoners of war. Also, it indicates that those terrorist
groups who beheaded those prisoners clearly violated the Conventions as they were not
given a proper trial or charged with a crime. This has become more of an issue over the
last decade or so because of how the militaries, intelligence agencies, and terrorist groups
have treated captured civilians and military officers throughout this current conflict.
The limitations of the Geneva Conventions are apparent as those conventions did
not prevent the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the suicide attack on the
USS Cole, the 1993 attack on the WTC, or 9/11 from happening. ―Preventing such
attacks is the real purpose of Geneva. Most people think of the Geneva Conventions as a
set of rules requiring humane treatment of prisoners of war. But their actual objective is
much broader than that. The Conventions were created to protect innocent civilians by
107
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deterring violations of the laws of war.‖108 The Conventions go even further in detail
about how prisoners of war should be treated and how the Detaining Power, as the
Conventions put it in the treaty, should go about this:
Art 13. Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or
omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health
of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious
breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected
to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are
not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned
and carried out in his interest. Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be
protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults
and public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited. 109
There has been controversy as to which tactics the CIA employs in order to gain
necessary intelligence of benefit to national security. Radical terrorist groups, like al
Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, however, have members who are citizens in states like
Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia. They seem to feel like the rules that
their countries adhere to do not apply to them. Then when some of their compatriots get
captured by Coalition forces or CIA operatives, these groups expect the Geneva
Conventions and all the rules about legal interrogation to be applied to them. 110
Otherwise, they threaten to go to the press with what is done to them, and the military
and intelligence agencies look like the criminals. 111 This confirms the CIA viewpoint of
terrorists not as prisoners of war but as enemy combatants because they do not act like
opposing military forces in an armed conflict; the Army Field Manual, however, still sees
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the terrorists as prisoners of war and treats them that way under Geneva and the rules of
war.
As Jack Goldsmith writes in his book, The Terror Presidency, under Geneva, ―(I)f
a soldier wears a uniform and complies with the basic laws of war, he would be treated
well if caught. But if (as terrorists do) he wears ordinary clothes and hides among
civilians, he endangers the innocent and acts treacherously toward rival soldiers, and thus
receives no rights under Geneva.‖ 112 This relates to the Agency‘s argument as to why the
enhanced program should be used as the terrorists are not part of an organized and known
military force.
Current Attorney General Eric Holder stated on CNN in 2002,
(O)ne of the things we clearly want to do with these prisoners is to have an ability
to interrogate them and find out what their future plans might be, where other cells
are located under; the Geneva Convention you are really limited in the amount of
information that you can elicit from people. It seems to me that given the way in
which they conducted themselves, however, that they are not, in fact, people
entitled to the protection of the Geneva Convention. They are not prisoners of
war.113
Furthermore, Paula Zahn goes on to ask Holder about John Walker Lindh, the American
Taliban and statist, regarding how much pressure the United States Government should
place on him to extract information out of him while they interrogate him. Holder
responded, ―Well, I mean, it‘s hard to interrogate him at this point now that he has a
lawyer and now that he is here in the United States. But to the extent that we can get
information from him, I think we should.‖ 114 Since Holder took the Attorney General
position in the Obama Administration and reviewed the July 29, 2009 Office of
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Professional Responsibility report on the CIA‘s enhanced interrogation program, he has
changed his stance on rights accorded by the Conventions. In a statement on August 24,
2009 following his review of the OPR report, Attorney General Eric Holder said:
I have reviewed the OPR report in depth. Moreover, I have closely examined the
full, still-classified version of the 2004 CIA Inspector General‘s report, as well as
other relevant information available to the Department. As a result of my analysis
of all of this material, I have concluded that the information known to me warrants
opening a preliminary review into whether federal laws were violated in connection
with the interrogation of specific detainees at overseas locations. 115
Allowing the Geneva Conventions to apply to the detainees of the CIA would, in essence,
undermine the Conventions and put America and its allies at great risk.

4.3

CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN
OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
Despite the fact that memos released in 2005 by the Justice Department stated that

the enhanced interrogation program conducted by the CIA was in accordance with the
UN convention and Geneva, the legality and morality of the program remained in
question. ―We conclude that use of these techniques, subject to the CIA‘s careful
screening criteria and limitations and its medical safeguards, is consistent with United
States obligations under Article 16 of the United Nations Convention against Torture.‖116
The USA has tried to comply with Geneva as well as the Convention against Torture, but
unlike Geneva, there were not nearly as many nations that signed to support this measure.
Nearly ninety countries less than those which signed Geneva signed the Convention
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against Torture.117 Interestingly, Iraq and Cuba never signed the Convention, but
Afghanistan did. Though the CIA still has to maintain the standards of Geneva and the
Torture Convention, interrogating enemy combatants in Cuba and Iraq provides the
Agency with some legal wiggle room, albeit very little room.
The Torture Convention includes language stipulating those who will be
interrogating detainees of any kind, on any level of law enforcement, should emphasize
the prohibition against torture. The Treaty also notes treatment which is appropriate and
humane. 118 As will be discussed in the next section regarding the Army Field Manual,
the Convention also states that all interrogations and the interrogators must be kept under
review to prove that the laws are being followed and torture is not occurring. 119 This
point is demonstrated by Thiessen when he writes:
The Justice Department found they (CIA‘s techniques) did not violate this standard
(cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment) under U.S. law either. But even if they
had, the Convention Against Torture (the international treaty barring torture) itself
permits an exception for cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in exigent
circumstances, such as a national emergency or war…Many of the enhanced
interrogation techniques used by our Intelligence Community have been declared
not to be torture by our allies and by the European Court of Human Rights.120
Articles 2, Section 2 of the Convention discusses torture and only torture not the
lesser side regarding cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. In order for the Agency to
avoid the torture classification in their interrogation program, they have to be extremely
careful as to whom they capture. A low-level captive being interrogated the same way as
a high-level captive will only create more problems than the information obtained will
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solve. In a related article regarding torture, Geneva, and al Qaeda, Steven Bradbury
points out:
The CIA must conclude based on available intelligence, that the detainee is an
important and dangerous member of an al Qaeda-affiliated group. The CIA must
then determine, at the Headquarters level and on a case-by-case basis with input
from the on-scene interrogation team that enhanced interrogation methods are
needed in a particular interrogation. Finally, the enhanced techniques, which have
been designed and implemented to minimize the potential for serious or
unnecessary harm to the detainees, may be used only if there are no medical or
psychological contraindications. 121
The Convention, like the Justice Department and Geneva, has seen a commitment from
the CIA on this last point. As the United States moves through the era of the Obama
Administration, on the other hand, the Federal Government has tried to be more sensitive
towards international public opinion and human rights groups.

4.4

ARMY FIELD MANUAL AND PENTAGON PROTOCOL
The Intelligence Community, especially the CIA, view interrogation as a

necessity of the job they are trained to do. John Yoo, deputy assistant Attorney General
at the Justice Department‘s Office of Legal Counsel from 2001 to 2003, helped to write
and review the memos between the CIA and the Justice Department regarding the
enhanced interrogation program. During this time, he stated: "To be sure, Article 31 of
the Fourth Convention prohibits any ‗physical or moral coercion‘ of civilians ‗to obtain
information from them,‘ and there is a clear prohibition of torture, physical abuse, and
denial of medical care, food, and shelter."122 President Obama and his Administration
have spoken about it since he entered into the White House and stated that the military,
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CIA, and any other intelligence agency or law enforcement agency needed to adhere not
only to the Geneva Conventions but also to the Army Field Manual.123 The latest edition
to the Army Field Manual was back in September of 2006, which is not a long time ago
but issues regarding the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, secret facilities and
bases run by the CIA, and the waterboarding interrogation technique have come up
repeatedly since then. ―In accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the only
interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized for use against any detainee,
regardless of status or characterization, are those authorized and listed in this Field
Manual.‖124 This seems to reiterate and strengthen not just the military‘s stance on
interrogation methods crossing the line into torture, but it seems that it reflects the
country as a whole politically.
If the Pentagon did not enforce these rules, then the bureaucrats from Washington
would be coming down hard on them. High-ranking officials at the Pentagon have a lot
at stake in regards to their careers and political lives because they have interaction with
Capitol Hill as well as the White House. They do not want to be making policy or
disturbing the equilibrium that they have with the politicians in Washington. According
to the manual, despite all the provisions, stipulations, and guidelines that have to be
followed, use ―of the approaches and techniques authorized and listed in this Field
Manual also require additional specified approval before implementation.‖ 125
One presumes, when it comes to national security and defending the nation during a
time of crisis, those same officials will try to do what is right for the country. They just
123

President Barack Obama, ―Executive Order 13491 of January 22, 2009: Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,‖ Federal
Register, Vol. 74, No. 16, January 27, 2009, Available online at: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1885.pdf.
Viewed on January 5, 2011.
124
Human Intelligence Collector Operations: FM 2-22.3, p. 8.
125
Ibid., p. 8

49

might be kept in the dark by those in the Intelligence Community, especially by the CIA.
Certainly the Army Field Manual limits interrogation:
Interrogation, the HUMINT subdiscipline responsible for MI exploitation of
enemy personnel and their documents to answer the supported specific
information requirements (SIRs), requires the HUMINT collector to be fully
familiar with both the classification of the source and applicable law. The
principles and techniques of HUMINT collection are to be used within the
constraints established by US law including the following:
• The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
• Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (including Common Article III), August 12,
1949; hereinafter referred to as GWS.
• Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (including
Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GPW.
• Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(including Common Article III), August 12, 1949; hereinafter referred to as GC.
• Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-163, Title XIV.126
This can give the American people a background as to how many laws might be violated
in order to acquire HUMINT that would affect the national security of the country. The
FBI has chiefly domestic authority. But abroad, it is the CIA‘s responsibility to gather
information among other countries. The Agency should be run this way in order to not
just save American lives but innocent lives of foreign allies throughout the world.
The manual outlines what exactly HUMINT (human intelligence) is and what it
entails. One of the main aspects of HUMINT, according to the Army Field Manual, is
interrogating Enemy Prisoners of War and other detainees.127 Another interesting aspect
of the Manual is that it points out that the potential sources for obtaining HUMINT
include threat, neutral, and friendly military and civilian personnel. Those people
providing the information do not have to be detainees/prisoners of war or members of a
military group or government. They can also be non-governmental organizations, local
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residents of the country, refugees, or even friendly military forces who pose a resistance
to radical groups causing disruptions to their countries.
It then reiterates that interrogations are allowed to be carried out to develop and
gather intelligence on their enemies and other aspects that might impact America‘s
national security. It goes on to state that it is solely the position of the Department of
Defense and military personnel, however, to carry out appropriate and legal
interrogations of detainees and others under the accordance of the laws of war, U.S. law,
international law, and other treaties. It then goes on to state that CI agents should not be
confused with HUMINT collectors. Those agents are specially trained and should be
used primarily to prevent intelligence from being accumulated by enemies. ―HUMINT
collectors are not to be confused with CI agents. CI agents are trained and certified for,
tasked with, and carry out the mission of denying the enemy the ability to collect
information on the activities and intentions of friendly forces. Although personnel in 97E
and 97B MOSs may use similar methods to carry out their missions, commanders should
not use them interchangeably.‖ 128 Some might consider this stepping onto the toes of the
CIA, but in a way this makes sense, as the CIA runs a clandestine operation and
interrogates confidentially but hopefully within the realm of U.S. and international law.
The Army Field Manual goes into further detail about the interrogation process
with the document including a thorough definition about interrogation as presented by the
DOD.
Interrogation is the systematic effort to procure information to answer specific
collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person
who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning. Some examples of
interrogation sources include EPWs and other detainees. Interrogation sources
range from totally cooperative to highly antagonistic. Interrogations may be
128
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conducted at all echelons in all operational environments. Detainee interrogation
operations conducted at a Military Police (MP) facility, coalition-operated facility,
or other agency-operated collection facility are more robust and require greater
planning, but have greater logistical support. Interrogations may only be conducted
by personnel trained and certified in the interrogation methodology, including
personnel in MOSs 97E, 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by
DOD policy. Interrogations are always to be conducted in accordance with the Law
of War, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the
HUMINT collector is operating. 129
One key thing to look at is where interrogations can take place, according to the
Army Field Manual. They can occur at any detainee collection facility. At these
facilities, certified military or other official personnel legally can collect information and
interrogate detainees as necessary. In some small cases, interrogations can occur out in
the field but only if proper procedure has been carried out, laws are followed, and
permission was granted to conduct the operation. 130 Even though the CIA is a separate
entity from the military because it is a non-DOD agency, it must receive special
permission to utilize the Army‘s facilities to commence an interrogation.
These requests must be approved by the JTF commander or, if there is no JTF
commander, the theater commander or appropriate higher level official. The
interrogation activity commander will assign a trained and certified interrogator to
escort non-DOD interrogators to observe their interrogation operations. The nonDOD personnel will sign for any detainee they want to question from the MPs,
following the same established procedures that DOD personnel must follow. In all
instances, interrogations or debriefings conducted by non-DOD agencies will be
observed by DOD personnel. In all instances, non-DOD agencies must observe the
same standards for the conduct of interrogation operations and treatment of
detainees as do Army personnel. All personnel who observe or become aware of
violations of Army interrogation operation standards will report the infractions
immediately to the commander. The personnel who become aware of mistreatment
of detainees will report the infractions immediately and suspend the access of nonDOD personnel to the facility until the matter has been referred to higher
headquarters. Non-DOD personnel conducting interrogation operations in an Army
facility must sign a statement acknowledging receipt of these rules, and agree to
follow them prior to conducting any interrogation operations.131
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This debate as to who has the right and is legally able to interrogate detainees has been
continuing since 9/11. As Lowenthal observes:
In late 2007, Congress was considering legislation that would limit interrogations to
those contained in the Army Field Manual, which allows nineteen interrogation
techniques but not some of the harsher techniques that intelligence officers had
apparently used on terrorists. There has also been a debate about the efficacy of
harsher techniques. Opponents argue that information obtained under these
circumstances cannot be reliable. Proponents disagree. CIA director Gen. Michael
Hayden said, in November 2007, that more than 70 percent of the intelligence used
in the latest terrorism NIE (national intelligence estimate) came from interrogated
terrorists.132
In order to examine and evaluate the methods and conduct which the CIA
employs in their interrogation program, acceptable interrogation techniques need to be
scrutinized from the Army Field Manual. The reason is these are the techniques that the
military, politicians, and the International Community have universally approved. If
there are striking similarities, arguments against the CIA‘s program will be harder to
prove and defend.
First, there are numerous techniques which the Army Field Manual prohibits that
will be on the CIA‘s accepted list of effective methods to use while interrogating enemy
combatants.133
If used in conjunction with intelligence interrogations, prohibited actions include,
but are not limited to— forcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or
pose in a sexual manner; placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; using
duct tape over the eyes; applying beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of
physical pain; waterboarding; using military working dogs; inducing hypothermia
or heat injury; conducting mock executions; and depriving the detainee of necessary
food, water, or medical care.134
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So, the Army Field Manual prohibits waterboarding as well as sensory deprivation, but as
was noted earlier and will be discussed further, these techniques have been used by the
CIA for decades with very little interference.
The Federal Government wants the military and the CIA to use this manual to the
letter because it covers all the legal roadblocks that might occur during an interrogation
of an enemy combatant. Plus, with listing which methods are prohibited, it follows
Geneva and the Convention against Torture to the letter. The Manual continuously states
throughout that prisoners should be treated humanely, avoiding violations of their rights
mentally, emotionally, and physically. The Manual lists and describes 18 techniques that
are acceptable plus one additional restrictive technique. 135
Even though, there were techniques that were not described, it seems apparent that
these techniques all have in common the obligation not to attempt any form of coercion
in any shape or form. The Pentagon and the Federal Government want to follow Geneva
and the Torture Convention so much that they have their interrogators use a multitude of
emotional approaches to coax or trick the detainee to divulge information. The
approaches in Appendix C appear to only be used on low-level enemy combatants and
detainees. The other approaches, however, appear to be the techniques used most often
on high-level detainees to get the information that the interrogators require as quickly and
efficiently as possible.
No one could reasonably maintain that the Army Field Manual exhausts the
universe of lawful tactics that the United States can use in terms of the interrogation
of these unlawful enemy combatants. Except for one technique, all the policies in
the Field Manual are designed for use with traditional, privileged Prisoners of War.
Terrorists are unlawful enemy combatants, and are not entitled to these traditional
very, very high privileges and standards applicable to Prisoners of War. 136
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Once again though, the military and government are treating terrorists either like
common criminals or prisoners of war, and as the world has learned since 9/11, these
terrorists do not engage in a modern war; the CIA knows this, which is why their
approach to extracting intelligence from these enemy combatants is slightly different.

4.5

CIA INTERROGATION PROGRAM AND CODE OF CONDUCT
Since the inception of the CIA, the intelligence agency‘s goal was to gather

information on American enemies and even the country‘s allies in order to protect the
nation on a foreign front, which in turn protects the country domestically. As time has
passed, the Agency has evolved in the ways it could gather and obtain intelligence from
sources through different methods, especially using interrogation. The CIA views
interrogation as a necessity of the job they are trained to do. Hands-on work, such as this,
is considered HUMINT (human intelligence), which many intelligence analysts and
officials use to put forth strategies and plans of attack that go to the Intelligence
Committees and the President or the Joint Intelligence Committees for review and
approval.
The problem that the Agency has had is that even though interrogation is an
essential part of gathering intelligence, the Agency has constantly debated whether their
techniques are torture. One of the reasons this has occurred is because critics of the
CIA‘s program do not have a solid understanding of the techniques the Agency
implements to extract intelligence from enemy combatants. 137 The perfect example to
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illustrate the difference in the CIA‘s interrogation practices of terrorists would be to
describe how a terrorist like Saddam Hussein interrogated prisoners. ―Saddam and his
henchmen drew amusement from dark methods such as boiling in oil, lowering captives
into shredding machines, or throwing them from atop tall buildings. In fact, they
videotaped various torture sessions for posterity. He also resorted to lesser forms of
torture such as electrocution of the genitals, clipping tongues, lopping off ears, gouging
out eyes, or chopping off fingers.‖138 If the CIA‘s methods are being compared to those
sadistic acts, then the CIA‘s interrogation program would look inconsequential.
The CIA has been very vocal in responding to critiques by the press, human rights
activists, the UN, and those in the government who are against the Agency‘s very
existence.139 The former Director of the CIA, General Michael V. Hayden, denied that
harsh, inhumane, and illegal methods of interrogation were used on high-valued captured
terrorists.
…the CIA‘s terrorist interrogation effort has always been small, carefully run, and
highly productive. Fewer than 100 hardened terrorists have gone through the
program since it began in 2002, and, of those, less than a third have required any
special methods of questioning. The Agency has over the years taken custody only
of those terrorists thought to have information on potential attacks or unique
insights into the workings of al-Qai‘da and its affiliates. The United States and its
allies have used the priceless intelligence from these men to disrupt plots, unravel
networks, and save lives.140
The former Director went on to describe that the CIA has cooperated with the
Department of Justice.141 Also, he stated that the Agency has kept within the limits of the
law in regards to interrogation, especially the interrogation of terrorists and others who
138
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belong to countries under protection of the Geneva Conventions and other international
laws and treaties.
…this vital counter-terror initiative has been subject to multiple legal and policy
reviews, inside CIA and beyond. The Agency has worked closely with the
Department of Justice and others in our government to ensure that the interrogation
program operates in strict accord with US law and takes full account of any changes
to the law. We have been proactive in seeking opinions that anticipate new
legislation or fresh interpretations of existing laws and treaties. We serve a
democracy of laws, and we underscore our place in that democracy by acting in
keeping with the law... a sustainable interrogation program requires not only
direction and guidance from the Executive Branch, but support from Congress. Our
oversight committees have been fully and repeatedly briefed on CIA‘s handling of
detainees. They know the exceptional value that comes from the careful, lawful, and
thorough questioning of key terrorists. They know what we do, and what we do not
do—and we do not torture. They also know the lengths to which CIA, and our
government as a whole, has gone to place and keep this source of intelligence
collection, our most valuable in terms of al-Qai‘da, on a sound and solid legal
footing. 142
The former Director is going to look out for his own in the Agency, including himself,
but the arguments he provided are self-evident. There are definitely some aspects of the
interrogation process, however, that the Director of the CIA might never divulge to the
press, the American public, or even to the Federal Government.
The other misconception that the public, media, politicians, and human rights
activists make is they equate terrorists to armed forces in a conventional modern war,
which the War on Terror is not. In most previous wars, America and its allies knew who
they were fighting because they were equipped with military uniforms and fought with
tactics outside the rule of law.
Our enemy is not an Army, wears no uniform, follows no rules recognized by us
and in fact, violates both the letter and the spirit of every aspect of the Convention.
So, it is logical to argue that in the case of terrorists the Convention should not
apply. Of course, the counter argument most commonly used is that the U.S. must
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take the high ground, forever observing the spirit of the Convention even when our
adversary does not.143
One thing is for certain, with the release and declassification of four memos
between the Agency and the Justice Department regarding the interrogation of al Qaeda
operatives (i.e. Abu Zubaydah), use of specific and in detail coercive techniques on
Zubaydah and other high-level al Qaeda terrorists, as well as other evidence suggest that
coercive techniques used in these interrogations are legal under the Convention Against
Torture. There is no denying which enhanced interrogation techniques the intelligence
agency utilizes, when they use them, why they use them, and the legality of these
methods. The debate returns to whether these techniques are considered torture under
domestic and international law. Torture is defined by Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Steven G. Bradbury in one of the declassified CIA-Justice Department
memos:
Torture is defined as an act committed by a person acting under color of law
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other
than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his
custody or physical control. Severe mental pain or suffering is defined as ―the
prolonged mental harm‖ caused by four acts: (1) ―the intentional, infliction or
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;‖ (2) ―the administration or
application, or threatened administration or application of mind-altering substances
or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;‖
(3) ―the threat of imminent death;‖ and (4) ―the threat that another person will
imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.‖ 144
As these memos show, the enhanced techniques employed by the CIA do not fall
under the category of torture as described, op. cit. ―The fact is none of the techniques
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used by the CIA meet the standard of torture in U.S. law. This is for two reasons: first,
because the CIA‘s interrogators did not specifically intend to inflict severe pain and
suffering; and second because they did not in fact inflict severe pain and suffering.‖ 145
After examining the techniques that are in the CIA‘s interrogation program, both
enhanced and normal methods, all of the techniques were permitted to be used and
considered legal. 146 ―The techniques that we analyzed were dietary manipulation, nudity,
the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the facial slap or insult slap, the abdominal
slap, cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, water dousing, extended sleep
deprivation, and the waterboard.‖147
The CIA does not employ its enhanced interrogation program on every single
person they capture. The Agency only employs those methods on what the interrogators,
head CIA personnel, and Agency bylaws consider to be high value detainees. Mr.
Bradbury addresses the CIA on this issue in one of the declassified memos:
You have advised that these techniques would be used only on an individual who is
determined to be a ‗High Value Detainee,‘ defined as: a detainee who, until time of
capture, we have reason to believe: (1) is a senior member of al Qaeda or an al
Qaeda associated terrorist group (Jemaah Islamiyyah, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, alZarqawi Group, etc.); (2) has knowledge of imminent terrorist threats against the
USA, its military forces, its citizens and organizations, or its allies; or that has/had
direct involvement in planning and preparing terrorist actions against the USA or its
allies, or assisting the al Qaeda leadership in planning and preparing such terrorist
actions; and (3) if released, constitutes a clear and continuing threat to the USA or
its allies. 148
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Another misconception is that the CIA interrogates these detainees in an isolated room
using any methods possible, including torture, to get them to talk as well as roughing
them up when they first arrive at the CIA facility. Again, Mr. Bradbury emphasizes what
the CIA has told the Justice Department regarding detainees being treated by medical
personnel prior to interrogation in a May 2005 memo:
You have also explained that, prior to interrogation; each detainee is evaluated by
medical and psychological professionals from the CIA‘s Office of Medical Services
(―OMS‖) to ensure that he is not likely to suffer any severe physical or mental pain
or suffering as a result of the interrogation. Technique-specific advanced approval
is required for all ―enhanced‖ measures and is conditional on on-site medical and
psychological personnel confirming from direct detainee examination that the
enhanced technique(s) is not expected to produce ―severe physical or mental pain or
suffering.‖ As a practical matter, the detainee‘s physical condition must be such
that these interventions will not have lasting effect, and his psychological state
strong enough that no severe psychological harm will result. 149
To further emphasize the above point, enhanced techniques, including
waterboarding, are used as training exercises for the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and
Escape (SERE) military program in order for military personnel (i.e. the Navy) to
withstand capture and subsequent interrogation. ―It is an established fact that
waterboarding has been used on tens of thousands of American service members during
SERE training. According to the Department of Justice, waterboarding was used on
26,829 American trainees from 1992 through 2001 in Air Force SERE training alone. To
this day, the Navy continues to use waterboarding as a part of its SERE training.‖ 150 The
CIA‘s enhanced interrogation techniques consist of eleven specific methods that range
from low pressure to high pressure including nudity, hooding, and dietary manipulation.
―These ten techniques are: (1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap
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(insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7) stress positions, (8) sleep
deprivation, (9) insects placed in a confinement box, and (10) the waterboard.‖ 151
The techniques are described in the declassified memos and Thiessen‘s book,
which will provide a lead out of this section of the study, and coinciding with a lead in to
the following chapter of the reasons for and against the enhanced interrogation program.
In regards to Nudity, Hooding, and Dietary Manipulation, ―(T)his involves keeping the
terrorist nude (except for a diaper), using a hood to keep him in the dark, and replacing
his regular diet with a liquid diet of Ensure nutrition shakes.‖ 152 The Attention Grasp
consists of ―grasping the individual with both hands, one hand on each side of the collar
opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the grasp, the
individual is drawn towards the interrogator.‖153 The Facial Hold is ―used to hold the
head immobile. One open palm is placed on either side of the individual‘s face. The
fingertips are kept well away from the individual‘s eyes.‖ 154 The Facial Slap occurs when
―the interrogator slaps the individual‘s face with fingers slightly spread. The hand makes
contact with the area directly between the tip of the individual‘s chin and the bottom of
the corresponding earlobe. The interrogator invades the individual‘s personal space. The
goal of the facial slap is not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting. Instead, the
purpose of the facial slap is to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation.‖ 155
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The next technique that can be implemented during enhanced interrogation is
Cramped Confinement. This ―involves the placement of the individual in a confined
space, the dimensions of which restrict the individual‘s movement. The confined space is
usually dark.‖156 Interrogators will determine how long the individual remains in this
type of confinement, however, based on the size of the area. ―For the larger space, the
individual can stand up or sit down; the smaller space is large enough for the subject to
sit down. Confinement in the larger space can last up to eighteen hours; for the smaller
space, confinement lasts for no more than two hours.‖157 Along with utilizing Cramped
Confinement, Stress Positions and Wall Standing are used to wear the individual down in
their mental focus and physical resistance. Then, the debriefing can begin and the
debriefers/analysts would then ask questions of the captured enemy combatants in order
to extract the necessary intelligence.
In one of the declassified CIA memos between the Agency and the Justice
Department, DOJ made it clear that the Stress Positions, Wall Standing, and Sleep
Deprivation would be allowed under the condition that no pain to the individual would
result from the certain positions that they would have to remain in for a period of time.
A variety of stress positions may be used. You have informed us that these
positions are not designed to produce the pain associated with contortions or
twisting of the body…they are designed to produce the physical discomfort
associated with muscle fatigue… (1) sitting on the floor with legs extended straight
out in front of him with his arms raised above his head; and (2) kneeling on the
floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle. 158
Wall Standing is another example of a technique the interrogators use to wear down the
resolve of enemy combatants in order to get them to cooperate. ―It is used to induce
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muscle fatigue. The individual stands about four to five feet from the wall, with his feet
spread approximately to shoulder width. His arms are stretched out in front of him, with
his fingers resting on the wall. His fingers support all of his body weight. The individual
is not permitted to move or reposition his hands or feet.‖159
One of the two final permitted forms of enhanced interrogation techniques is
Sleep Deprivation.
You have indicated that your purpose in using this technique is to reduce the
individual‘s ability to think on his feet and, through the discomfort associated with
lack of sleep, to motivate him to cooperate. The effect of such sleep deprivation
will generally remit after one or two nights of uninterrupted sleep…Moreover,
personnel with medical training are available to and will intervene in the unlikely
event of an abnormal reaction.160
Of course, the final method of enhanced interrogation, and the one that has brought forth
the most controversy to the CIA‘s program, is the Waterboard.
In this procedure, the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench, which is
approximately four feet by seven feet. The individual‘s feet are generally elevated.
A cloth is placed over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a
controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose
and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, air
flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This
causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual‘s blood. This increase in
the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the
cloth produces the perception of ‗suffocation and incipient panic,‘ i.e., the perception
of drowning. The individual does not breathe any water into his lungs. After this
period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three
or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the
removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated…but it would last no
longer than 20 minutes in any given period of time…We also understand that a
medical expert with SERE experience will be present throughout this phase and that
the procedures will be stopped if deemed medically necessary to prevent severe
mental or physical harm. 161
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With these techniques in mind and knowing that the CIA has been allowed to carry out
these techniques by the President and the Justice Department, it is time to move to the
reasons for using these techniques. Have they been effective in fighting the War on
Terror? How are they compliant with the Geneva Conventions? What is the estimated
number of attacks on America and its allies that have been prevented due to the
intelligence received from these techniques? What opposing arguments still remain
despite the legal claims that the Agency possesses?

5

REASONS FOR AND AGAINST CIA ENHANCED INTERROGATION

5.1

INTRODUCTION
Section 5.2 will discuss the reason for the CIA to use enhanced interrogation

techniques in the War on Terror. The two main factors that are involved are American
national security and preventing or at least hindering terrorist efforts domestically and
abroad.
Section 5.3 will look at two of the minor factors for the CIA to use their enhanced
interrogation program. The first factor is to provide aid in protecting American allies
across the globe. Secondly, the Agency, as per their mission statement, op. cit., is one of
only a few organizations in the Intelligence Community or the military that have direct
authorization by the President to carry out such operations.
Section 5.4 will look at the opposing viewpoints why the CIA should not employ
enhanced techniques in the War on Terror. The most publicized reason for the opposition
is the enhanced technique of waterboarding.

64

Finally, Section 5.5 will round out the chapter by discussing a couple of the minor
factors as to why the CIA should not employ enhanced methods such as physical stress
while being detained. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay will be briefly revisited here as
allegations of physical and psychological abuse by interrogators towards the detainees
will be addressed.

5.2

MAJOR REASONS FOR: AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND
HINDERING TERRORIST EFFORTS DOMESTICALLY/ABROAD
Umar Islam, who was one of the alleged plotters in the foiled transatlantic plane

hijackings, aka the Heathrow Plot, stated the following in his suicide video and later used
as evidence during his trial for the terrorist plot:
This is revenge for the actions of the USA in the Muslim lands and their
accomplices such as the British and the Jews. This is a warning to the nonbelievers that if they do not leave our lands there are many more like us and many
more like me ready to strike until the law of Allah is established on this earth.
Know that without doubt your dead are in the hellfire whilst the Muslims who died
due to your attacks will be in paradise. Martyrdom operations upon martyrdom
operations will keep on raining on these Kuffar (non-believers) until they release
you and leave our lands.162
When 9/11 occurred, Americans and the world were alarmed to note just how far a
terrorist organization would go to make its point about its religion and the evils of the
western world.163 The Heathrow Plot included numerous operatives. Six of the eight
martyrdom videos were found, used in subsequent trials as proof of their motive to carry
out the attack, and then released to BBC News in the UK. 164
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The Allied forces deserve a lot of credit, especially when they were able to
capture KSM in March of 2003 from intelligence acquired by the CIA‘s counterpart in
Israel, the Mossad.165 Without their cooperation, as well as other intelligence agencies
throughout the world, there would have been no guarantees of KSM‘s capture, his
subsequent interrogation by the CIA, or the security of America. This was a vital piece
of information not just for American national security, but for the security of American
allies and innocent civilians. KSM‘s information was a vital component in preventing
further terror attacks, apprehending over a thousand suspects, and retrieving vital
information from some of those detainees by placing them in the CIA‘s enhanced
interrogation program. 166
―As a detainee, he (KSM) has provided reports that have shed light on alQa‘ida‘s strategic doctrine, plots and probable targets, key operatives, and the likely
methods for attacks in the US homeland, leading to the disruption of several plots against
the United States.‖167 Due to the hard work by American armed forces, Allied forces,
federal law enforcement agencies, and the CIA, one presumes, America has not been
successfully attacked for nearly a decade since 9/11.
Not all legislators on Capitol Hill share the opinion of the critics of the CIA‘s
program. In fact, they think that without it, there is no telling what could have happened
to the security of the nation. Senator Joe Lieberman, then the Chairman of the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in the Senate, said: ―We assess that al
Qaeda's homeland plotting is likely to continue on prominent political, economic and

165

Central Intelligence Agency, ―Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa‘ida,‖ July 14, 2004, p. 1,
Available online at: http://ccrjustice.org/files/CIA%20KSM%20Preeminent%20Source.pdf. Viewed on June 10, 2010.
166
George W. Bush, Decision Points, (New York: Crown Publishing Group of Random House, Inc., 2010), p. 220-225.
167
Central Intelligence Agency, ―Khalid Shaykh Muhammad: Preeminent Source on Al-Qa‘ida,‖ p. 1.

66

infrastructure targets, with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic
destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear in the U.S. population,‘ end of
quote.‖168 As this Senate Committee testimony indicates, al Qaeda is still being
perceived as a major threat despite the fact that their forces have been on the run since the
War on Terror began back in 2001. Nearly six years later, Congressman and Senators
were still debating whether or not the war was a wise decision, and if the CIA should be
conducting interrogations in the manner that they are/were. Now, it has been almost a
decade since 9/11, and in the eyes of the victims‘ families as well as the men and women
of the military and the CIA, they have not forgotten what their job has and always will
be: to protect America from all threats, especially terroristic threats, domestically and
internationally.
KSM helped the CIA foil other terrorist plots, but even without his cooperation,
the CIA managed to stop other plots after capturing other leaders from al Qaeda, Hamas,
and other terrorist cells. 169 Once the Agency operatives conducted the enhanced
interrogation on KSM and others, they were able to uncover numerous attacks slated to
occur post-9/11 and beyond for the next couple of years. 170 It was not just the United
States, though, that was al Qaeda‘s main target. The group also wanted to attack Asia,
Europe, and the Middle East in order to convert the world to Islam:
He (KSM) has admitted to hatching a plot in late 2001 to use Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into the tallest building on the US West
Coast. From late 2001 until his capture in early 2003, KSM also conceived several
low-level plots, including an early 2002 plan to send al-Qa‘ida operative and US
citizen Jose Padilla to set off bombs in high-rise apartment buildings in an
unspecified major US city and an early 2003 plot to employ a network of
168
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Pakistanis—including Iyman Faris and Majid Khan—to target gas stations, railroad
tracks, and the Brooklyn Bridge in New York. KSM has also spoke at length about
operative Ja‘far al-Tayyar, admitting that al-Qa‘ida had tasked al-Tayyar to case
specific targets in New York City in 2001…During 2000-2001, KSM plotted
attacks against US and other targets in Southeast Asia using al-Qa‘ida and JI
operatives, but after the 11 September attacks he claims that he largely regarded JI
operatives as a resource for his plots against targets in Europe and the United States.
KSM took a robust role in directing and assisting operations during 2002 and early
2003, providing money to Hambali for terrorist plots in East Asia, and encouraging
attacks against US targets in Saudi Arabia. He has also revealed details of the alQa‘ida bombing of the Djerba synagogue in Tunisia in April 2002. 171
During the aforementioned Senate Committee hearing, Senator Lieberman
continued with his testimony describing in general detail some of the plots the CIA has
blunted in part because of KSM‘s and other terrorists‘ testimonies. This testimony was
recorded by debriefing personnel of the Agency after enhanced interrogations were
implemented:
Consider the most recent plot broken up in Germany with, I might say proudly, the
help of American intelligence operatives. This plot, which German officials have
said was professionally organized mostly by native Germans who were radicalized
in Germany, was nonetheless carried out by these people after they traveled to al
Qaeda camps in Waziristan for training. And then remember the actual and foiled
attacks that originated in England, Scotland, Spain, Algeria, Denmark and so many
other places, all also locally plotted, some aimed at America and/or American
targets. These are the evils and dangers of our age that we must live with and
defend against.172
On the other side of this praise by the Senator, the Federal Government also must take
some of the blame in placing American national security at risk when the Obama
Administration declassified four memos between the Justice Department and the CIA
regarding the enhanced interrogation program.
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Former CIA director Michael Hayden, described it best when asked if he was
against the declassification, if he was asked to provide his input to the current
government, and what this does to the program and American national security:
I wasn't asked. We weren't asked. We were informed as a courtesy by the agency
that this was a pending decision, and all of us self-initiated, voluntarily, to call the
White House and express our views. I should add, too, that the current director,
Director Panetta, shared our views. I mean, if you look — if you look at what this
really comprises, if you look at the documents that have been made public, it says
top secret at the top. The definition of top secret is information which, if revealed,
would cause grave harm to U.S. security — the release of them would be a grave
threat to national security. Now, the president made a different decision fully
within his authority. The president is the ultimate classification authority. 173
The Bush Administration and their legal counsel wanted to make sure that the
enhanced interrogation program complied with Geneva, the Convention against Torture,
and United States laws. The head of President Bush‘s legal counsel, Alberto Gonzales,
and his team deemed that the CIA‘s program did in fact comply with Geneva for several
reasons and under several statutes. Gonzales began his legal justification with reasons
why al Qaeda should not be held to Common Article III of Geneva.
We conclude that Geneva III does not apply to the al Qaeda terrorist organization.
Therefore, neither the detention nor trial of al Qaeda fighters is subject to Geneva
III. Three reasons support this conclusion. First, al Qaeda is not a State and thus
cannot receive benefits of a State party to the Conventions. It is a nongovernmental terrorist organization composed of members from many nations, with
ongoing operations in dozens of nations. Conduct towards captured members of al
Qaeda, therefore, also cannot constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (c)(1).
Second, al Qaeda members fail to satisfy the eligibility requirements for treatment
as POWs under Geneva Convention III. Article 4(A)(2) of Geneva III requires that
militia or volunteers fulfill four conditions: command by responsible individuals,
wearing insignia, carrying arms openly, and obeying the laws of war. Al Qaeda
have violated all these conditions by attacking purely civilian targets of no military
value, refusing to wear uniform or insignia or carry arms openly, but instead
hijacking civilian airliners, taking hostages and killing them, and they themselves
do not obey the laws of war concerning the protection of the lives of civilians or the
means of legitimate combat. Third, the nature of the conflict precludes application
of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. It is not an international war
173
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between nation-States because al Qaeda is not a State. Al Qaeda operates in many
countries and carried out a massive international attack on the United States on
September 11, 2001. Therefore, the military‘s treatment of al Qaeda is not limited
either by common article 3 or 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3).174
Lead Counsel Gonzales and Assistant Attorney General Bybee, like the legal memo
above, put out several memos from 2002 through 2004 to justify legally why the CIA‘s
enhanced interrogation program would not be violating domestic law, Common Article
III of Geneva, and the Convention against Torture. They cited several Supreme Court
cases that ruled that military and intelligence officials interrogating suspects did not
violate the Convention, Common Article 3, or 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A including
United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001)175; United States v. Karro,
257 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2001)176; United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th
Cir. 2000)177; South Atl. Lmtd. Ptrshp. of Tenn. v. Reise, 218 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir.
2002)178. Bybee and Gonzales also cited a relevant international court case from 1978
when the European Court of Human Rights distinguished between torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in Ireland v. the United Kingdom.179
What is important to note on that case is the fact that the European Court examined
interrogation techniques that the UK employed at the time, specifically wall standing,
hooding, subjection to noise, sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink. The
Court deemed that these techniques were inhuman and degrading but not torture. The
CIA employed some of those techniques in their enhanced interrogation program. All the
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enhanced techniques are described in full detail in the declassified memos with legal
reasoning that does not violate Geneva or the Convention against Torture.180
Declassifying the memos regarding the program was part of the Obama
Administration‘s justification of ending the program in Executive Order 13491.
Revealing the CIA program‘s specific details about enhanced interrogation, for this or
any reason could evolve into a significant national security threat. If any terrorist cell
were to read those memos, they would then know how to prepare for the interrogations,
what tactics the Agency would use, how to train to withstand the methods that would be
used on them, and overall be more prepared to fight the War on Terror. General Hayden
remarks:
Sure. At the tactical level, what we have described for our enemies in the midst of a
war are the outer limits that any American would ever go to in terms of
interrogating an Al Qaeda terrorist. That's very valuable information. Now, it
doesn't mean we would always go to those outer limits, but it describes the box
within which Americans will not go beyond. To me, that's very useful for our
enemies, even if, as a policy matter, this president at this time had decided not to
use one, any, or all of those techniques. It still reveals those outer limits, and that's
very important.181
James Jay Carafano of the Heritage Foundation points out, ―(A)ccording to thenCIA Director George Tenet, more than two-dozen terrorists, half of them al-Qaeda
suspects, were brought to justice by rendition between July 1998 and February 2000...
After 9/11, the United States greatly expanded its use of rendition. Between 100 and 150
major terrorist suspects have been apprehended under the policy since 9/11.‖ 182 President
Bush made the following remarks during his national speech in September 2006 mainly
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regarding the CIA‘s enhanced interrogation program and many other points all while the
9/11 victims‘ families were in attendance:
―This is not for the lack of desire or determination on the part of the enemy. As the
recently foiled plot in London shows, the terrorists are still active, and they're still
trying to strike America, and they're still trying to kill our people. One reason the
terrorists have not succeeded is because of the hard work of thousands of dedicated
men and women in our government, who have toiled day and night, along with our
allies, to stop the enemy from carrying out their plans. And we are grateful for these
hardworking citizens of ours.‖183
5.3

TWO MINOR REASONS FOR CIA TO USE ENHANCED
INTERROGATION
Former Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte noted the following

regarding the number of terrorist threats America faces today, and what it takes to stop
these threats from becoming attacks:
We live in a world that is full of conflict, contradictions, and accelerating change.
Viewed from the perspective of the Director of National Intelligence, the most
dramatic change of all is the exponential increase in the number of targets we must
identify, track, and analyze. Today, in addition to hostile nation-states, we are
focusing on terrorist groups, proliferation networks, alienated communities,
charismatic individuals, narcotraffickers, and microscopic influenza. The 21st
century is less dangerous than the 20th century in certain respects, but more
dangerous in others. Globalization, particularly of technologies that can be used to
produce WMD, political instability around the world, the rise of emerging powers
like China, the spread of the jihadist movement, and of course, the horrific events of
September 11, 2001, demand heightened vigilance from our Intelligence
Community. 184
The CIA‘s repeated attempts to try to prevent terrorism from affecting millions of
innocent Americans have grown global and have now affected American allies. KSM
admitted as much during his interrogation while in CIA custody. ―KSM stated that he
183
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had planned a second wave of hijacking attacks even before September 2001 but shifted
his aim from the United States to the United Kingdom because of the United States‘ post11 September security posture and the British Government‘s strong support for
Washington‘s global war on terror.‖185 The major plot that KSM discussed was the
Heathrow Plot. ―In addition to attempting to prepare this so-called Heathrow Plot—in
which he planned to have multiple aircraft attack Heathrow Airport and other targets in
the United Kingdom—KSM launched a number of plots against the United States.‖186
Due to the capture and interrogation of KSM by the CIA, the plot was foiled and
thousands of innocent civilians were saved on an international level.
We assessed that al Qaeda's homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on
prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets, designed to produce mass
casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or
fear among our population. Al Qaeda's affiliates from Africa to Southeast Asia also
pose a significant terrorist threat. Al Qaeda in Iraq, AQI as we refer to it, has been
weakened during the past year, but it remains al Qaeda's most visible and capable
affiliate. Another affiliate, al Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM,
is the most active terrorist group in northwestern Africa. We assess it represents a
significant threat to U.S. and European interests in the region. Other al Qaeda
regional affiliates kept a lower profile in 2007, but we judge that they remain
capable of conducting attacks against U.S. interests. Home grown extremists
inspired by militant Islamic ideology, but without operational direction from al
Qaeda, are an evolving danger, both inside the U.S. and to our interests abroad.
Disrupted plotting last year in the United States illustrates the nature of this threat.
In addition, our European allies continue to uncover new extremist networks
plotting against the U.S. as well as targets in Europe. 187
From this testimony and by the sheer volume of examples provided by KSM and other
captured terrorists‘ testimony, it appears that terrorism will remain a threat for quite some
time. It is a matter of how it is combated, however, and if the CIA, other American
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intelligence agencies, and their international counterparts will not be handcuffed by their
respective governments and the United Nations in the fight. Common Article III of the
Geneva Convention, and the Convention against Torture must be adhered to, but when an
adversary is playing by a different set of rules—as al Qaeda and other terrorist cells have
been playing by for years—it might be time to stop the debate and allow the enhanced
interrogation methods to resume. There are numerous legal memos from the Bush
Judicial and Defense Departments with specific justification for the CIA program by
court cases, U.S. law, and international law. 188 Former Director of National Intelligence,
John D. Negroponte, states:
Collaboration with our friends and allies around the world has helped us achieve
some notable successes against the global jihadist threat. In fact, most of alQa‘ida‘s setbacks last year were the result of our allies‘ efforts, either independently
or with our assistance. And since 9/11, examples of the high level of
counterterrorism efforts around the world are many. Pakistan‘s commitment has
enabled some of the most important captures to date. Saudi Arabia‘s resolve to
counter the spread of terrorism has increased. Our relationship with Spain has
strengthened since the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The British have long
been our closest counterterrorism partners—the seamless cooperation in the
aftermath of the July attacks in London reflected that commitment—while
Australia, Canada, France and many other nations remain stout allies. 189
The War on Terror is far from over, and the United States should not forget that its
enemy will not stop just because some of its leaders have been neutralized. Mr.
Negroponte discusses this further by stating:
Attacking the US Homeland, US interests overseas, and US allies—in that order—
are al-Qa‘ida‘s top operational priorities. The group will attempt high-impact
attacks for as long as its central command structure is functioning and affiliated
groups are capable of furthering its interests, because even modest operational
capabilities can yield a deadly and damaging attack. Although an attack using
conventional explosives continues to be the most probable scenario, al-Qa‘ida
remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
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materials or weapons to attack the United States, US troops, and US interests
worldwide.190
The United States, its military, and the CIA are leading challengers to international
terrorism, but with attacks in Morocco in May 2003, bombings in Spain in March 2004,
and bombing in the UK in July 2005, this is no longer just the United States‘ war to fight.
It is affecting more and more American allies/enemies as it moves forward. This global
struggle that terrorists in al Qaeda and its affiliate cells proclaim on the West is not
relenting. When the United Nations, the American government, and other nations put
forth international and domestic policy about restricting intelligence agencies‘
capabilities to conduct interrogations to obtain information on location of cells, plots, and
weapons, then the world is facing not only an internal problem, but an external one as
well.
It cannot be forgotten that the CIA has helped foil numerous terrorist plots
domestically and abroad since 9/11 through the use of their enhanced interrogation
program as well as their sharing of intelligence with other agencies in the Federal
Government.191 The Agency has also shared intelligence with their counterparts
internationally to help capture numerous leaders of al Qaeda and other factions, as well as
using their interrogation program to help those other agencies parry terrorist attacks that
were beyond the CIA‘s jurisdiction. 192
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The CIA, as the USA‘s primary intelligence supplier, has been entrusted with
many borderline roles in this conflict. Political leadership changes over the past couple
of years have slightly altered that approach as the current Administration put forth
Executive Orders 13491 and 13492 to end the enhanced interrogation program, adhere to
the Geneva Conventions, close Guantanamo Bay, and follow the interrogation guidelines
of the Army Field Manual.193 Nonetheless, the CIA continues to move forward in the
War on Terror to gather useful intelligence in order to help aid America in the fight.
Although, the Agency is still first in line in obtaining intelligence to thwart
terrorist efforts in the United States and abroad, it must cooperate with other agencies in
the Federal Government. In the aftermath of 9/11, the CIA conducted enhanced
interrogations of captured terrorists, but under the Obama Administration, those methods
have been called into question and halted. This leads us into the next section of this
chapter. What are the objections against the Agency‘s enhanced interrogation program?
What national and international legal ramifications have been raised? What aspects of
the program are being called into question?

5.4

MAIN REASON AGAINST ENHANCED INTERROGATION:
WATERBOARDING
General Michael Hayden discussed the opposition to waterboarding on Meet the

Press stating, ―But John McCain, who will be the Republican nominee for president, a
former POW, said this: ‗All I can say is that ‗waterboarding‘ was used in the Spanish
Inquisition, it was used in Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia, and there are reports that it is
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being used against Buddhist monks today...It is torture.‘‖194 Waterboarding and physical
abuse among detainees and other captured terrorists have been the most prevalent stories
to come at the CIA and the White House. Human rights groups continue to demand that
the detainees receive humane treatment, and the International Community continue to
demand that the CIA and the United States adhere to the Geneva Conventions. 195
Despite the fact that the CIA and the Federal Government have provided
arguments that waterboarding is not torture and that in fact it has been used as SERE
training by the Pentagon for decades as well as being deemed legal by the Justice
Department,196 opponents argue that it is a form of torture to simulate a drowning
sensation on the detainee. 197 It is true there have been forms of water torture used in the
past, but not by the CIA. In fact, there is a big difference between the water torture used
by some civilizations and waterboarding.
An example would be the Japanese conducting a water torture method in WWII:
―The victim was bound or otherwise secured in a prone position; and water was forced
through his mouth and nostrils into his lungs and stomach until he lost consciousness.
Pressure was then applied, sometimes by jumping upon his abdomen to force the water
out. The usual practice was to revive the victim and successively repeat the process.‖ 198
Another example would be the Tokio-wine treatment in China and the rice torture in
Borneo. ―Interrogators used hoses and teakettles to funnel water down the throat.
Torturers fed starved prisoners large amounts of uncooked rice, and then pumped them
194
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full of water causing the rice to expand, stretching the internal organs and inflicting
immense pain.‖199
Opponents of the CIA‘s enhanced interrogation program still proclaim that it is a
method of torture. ―Waterboarding is a technique invented by the Spanish Inquisition,
perfected by the Khmer Rouge, and in between, banned—originally banned for excessive
cruelty—by the Gestapo!‖ observed Senator Chris Dodd.200 This relates to the
misconception of the number of times that KSM was waterboarded while being
interrogated back in 2003 and 2004. It was rumored that KSM was waterboarded over
183 different times at various time intervals that each session lasted.201 In one of the CIA
memos that President Obama declassified in 2009, the CIA provided statistics of those
who were subjected to the waterboarding training while in the Navy and Air Force. ―Of
the 26,829 students trained from 1992 through 2001 in the Air Force SERE training, 4.3
percent of those students had contact with psychology services. Of those 4.3 percent,
only 3.2 percent were pulled from the program for psychological reasons. Thus, out of
the students trained overall, only 0.14 percent were pulled from the program for
psychological reasons…with respect to the waterboard, you have also orally informed us
that the Navy continues to use it in training.‖202
Opponents to this interrogation technique argue that waterboarding causes
physical and psychological harm, and while there might be a rare instance as noted
above, whether it is during military training or an interrogation, the results normally seem
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to come without consequences to the individual. 203 When the Obama Administration
came into office in January 2009 and issued Executive Orders 13491 and 13492, it was
the new CIA director himself, Leon Panetta, who stated he did not want to be a part of an
agency that tortured detainees.
It was partly Panetta‘s rectitude that got him the C.I.A. job. During the Bush years,
he decried the country‘s loss of moral authority; in a blunt essay for Washington
Monthly last year, he declared that Americans had been transformed ―from
champions of human dignity and individual rights into a nation of armchair
torturers.‖ He concluded, ―We either believe in the dignity of the individual, the
rule of law, and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, or we don‘t. There
is no middle ground.‖204
This was not the mindset of everyone involved with the current Administration.
Before the above article even came out, Attorney General Eric Holder was involved with
a House Judiciary Committee hearing in May 2009 and expressed why he thought
waterboarding and the enhanced interrogation program was not illegal. Holder stated:
―It‘s not torture in the legal sense because you‘re not doing it with the intention of
harming these people physically or mentally.‖205 It seems that the President does not see
eye to eye with his Attorney General as he said almost the exact opposite a few weeks
before the hearing in a speech delivered to all CIA employees at Langley on April 20,
2009: ―A democracy as resilient as ours must reject the false choice between our security
and our ideals and that is why these methods of interrogation are already a thing of the
past.‖206
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The problem opponents of the CIA interrogation program like President Obama,
his Administration, members of Congress, human rights groups, and international
politicians have here is the preconceived notion that waterboarding and other enhanced
methods are physically and mentally harmful while producing unreliable results. They
read about past uses of a method that replicates waterboarding, but is not the same
technique and is not administered in the same way.
Cheap, simple, and horribly effective, waterboarding dates back at least to the
Spanish Inquisition as a way of extracting information by instilling extreme fear
and pain without leaving visible marks...The technique, however, has hardly varied
in the past 500 years. Its intention is to simulate slow drowning and terrify the
victim into a confession... Agents of the Dutch East India Company used a variation
of waterboarding during the Amboyna Massacre of 1623 when twenty people,
including ten employed by the British East India Company, were tortured and
murdered… Many of the world‘s nastiest regimes have resorted to waterboarding,
including the Gestapo and Kempeitai (the Japanese military police) during the
Second World War, the Khmer Rouge, and the Pinochet regime, where the method
was known, with grim euphemism, as ―Asian torture‖… The technique of ―slow
motion drowning‖ inflicts intense mental and physical suffering, and can cause
severe long-term damage to the lungs and brain, but it leaves no obvious physical
marks on the body. As well as being deniable, this form of torture may be inflicted
repeatedly. There is also no doubt that waterboarding works, to the extent that it
producing confessions. Whether the information extracted is of any value is more
doubtful. A person on the point of drowning may tell the truth, or simply what he
thinks the torturer wants to hear to stop the ordeal. 207
Though the declassified CIA memos with the Justice Department have revealed
that several of the high-level detainees, such as KSM, have been waterboarded and have
revealed invaluable information that has helped to foil numerous terrorist plots (i.e. the
Heathrow Plot, bombings of the U.S. consulate and Western residences in Karachi,
Pakistan, and a U.S. Marine camp in Djibouti),208 opponents are still unconvinced as to
how reliable the information is under this technique. ―Inside the CIA, waterboarding is
cited as the technique that got Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the prime plotter of the Sept. 11,
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2001, terrorist attacks, to begin to talk and provide information -- though ‗not all of it
reliable,‘ a former senior intelligence official said.‖209 Later in the article, Mr. Pincus
quoted Senator Ted Kennedy regarding military commission legislation and former
punishments for waterboarding demanded by the US after WWII: ―Asano was sentenced
to 15 years of hard labor, Sen. Kennedy told his colleagues last Thursday during the
debate on military commissions‘ legislation. We punished people with 15 years of hard
labor when waterboarding was used against Americans in World War II, he said.‖210
Waterboarding has been at the forefront for why the CIA‘s enhanced interrogation
program should never be used again, but there is also the matter of physical abuse that
has come up during the last decade. An example that tests the Army Field Manual and
Geneva Conventions‘ rules is an exercise involving mock prisoners and interrogation at
the now infamous Guantanamo Bay that went terribly wrong.
A National Guardsman, Sean Baker, serving as an MP at the detention facility
volunteered to be a mock prisoner in a routine exercise that military personnel and
intelligence agents go through in the transportation and interrogation of prisoners.
The key thing here was that whenever he did not want to participate any longer or
had enough of the ―rough‖ treatment, he was to speak the code word ―red‖ for the
team to stop and for the exercise to cease.211
Mr. Soldz continues: ―However, when he uttered this word, the team started
handling him roughly and began to slam his head off the concrete floor. He continued
yelling out that he was a U.S. soldier and yelling the code word out. Eventually, they
stopped the assault on Baker, but he ended up having permanent injuries and severe brain
trauma causing him to have epileptic seizures to this day.‖ 212 Examples of prisoner abuse

209

Walter Pincus, Washington Post, October 5, 2006.
Ibid.
211
Stephen Soldz, ―Psychology and Coercive Interrogations in Historical Perspective: Aid and Comfort for Torturers,‖
March 17, 2007, Available online at: http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2007/04/15/527. Viewed on August 4,
2010.
212
Ibid.
210

81

such as this should not be tolerated, but the CIA has also been known to experiment with
other methods that could be considered controversial or abusive.
Soldz‘s article went on to describe a very controversial method that the CIA has
been experimenting with for a long time: truth serum or as others call it, mind control:
At first defensively, and then as an offensive tool, the CIA undertook what became
a 25-year program of research into mind control techniques under a variety of
names, including, most notoriously MKULTRA. While time precludes an extensive
review of this program, [the December 1977 APA Monitor contains an account of
some of these activities] two components are of special relevance to today's topic. 1)
For years the Agency, as the CIA is known, searched for a magic "truth serum" that
would allow them to get captives to reveal their secrets; and 2) the CIA and the
military funded extensive research into potentially effective interrogation
techniques, including the possible use of hypnosis, of drugs, of isolation and
extreme sensory deprivation, of brain stimulation, etc..213
All the above interrogation techniques that the CIA and military have funded have all
been considered forms of torture under the Geneva Conventions. This will transition into
the final section of this chapter: the minor reasons against the enhanced interrogation
program. Physical abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have been discussed
previously, but they are going to be revisited as well as adding some more detail and
examples of the abuse that may or may not have occurred on the CIA‘s watch or during
interrogations.

5.5

MINOR REASONS AGAINST ENHANCED INTERROGATION:
PHYSICAL ABUSE AND ABU GHRAIB/GUANTANAMO BAY
REVISITED
―Previously secret sworn statements by detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq

describe in raw detail abuse that goes well beyond what has been made public, adding
213
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allegations of prisoners being ridden like animals, sexually fondled by female soldiers
and forced to retrieve their food from toilets.‖214 Despite the documented successes of
the CIA‘s enhanced interrogation program, there have been some aspects of the program
and how it was carried out that have been called into question.215 Previously mentioned
was the main technique implemented on KSM, waterboarding, in order to acquire his
cooperation in extracting invaluable information on the inner workings of al Qaeda‘s
infrastructure and future terrorist plots. The other aspects of the program called into
question would be the treatment of the enemy combatants held at CIA black sites and
other facilities operated by the Agency.
During a speech delivered to the Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy stated:
There is ample evidence that American officials, both military and CIA, have used
extremely harsh interrogation techniques overseas, and that many prisoners have
died in our custody. Administration officials admit that 37 foreign prisoners have
died in captivity, and several of these cases are under investigation, some as
homicides. On June 17, David Passaro, a CIA contractor, was indicted for assault
for beating an Afghan detainee with a large flashlight.216
One does not make light, however, of abuses that have occurred to some detainees in
detention facilities, CIA facilities, and prisons. On the other hand, this does not reflect on
the entire Agency or the military and does not coincide with what typically occurs in the
interrogation rooms. James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation stated in a recent
article:
According to Pentagon spokesmen, U.S. military policy was to treat the detainees at
the Abu Ghraib facility outside Baghdad in the same manner as enemy prisoners of
war. That means they should have been accorded the rights and protections granted
under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, which precludes physical and mental
torture, any form of coercion, threats, insults, or disadvantageous treatment. For an
214
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American soldier, there are few crimes more shameful than breeching the standards
of conduct established by the laws of war. 217
Whoever was responsible for the abuses at these prisons and facilities should be
punished to the extent of American law because they violated the rules of war. During
his time in office, President Bush firmly denounced the treatment of the detainees at Abu
Ghraib after the story of what was occurring at the prison became public knowledge. 218
President Bush discussed the Abu Ghraib situation on what would later air on Arab TV
network Al-Jazeera on December 7, 2008: ―Abu Ghraib was a terrible disappointment.
And admittedly, I wasn‘t there on site, but I was the Commander-in-Chief of a military
where these disgraceful acts took place that sent the absolute wrong image about America
and our military.‖219
The report on the abuses at Abu Ghraib went further and described some of the
treatments that the MPs at the prison inflicted on the detainees: ―punching, slapping, and
kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet; videotaping and photographing naked
male and female detainees; positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag
on his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;
using military dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least
one case biting and severely injuring a detainee; taking photographs of dead Iraqi
detainees; etc.‖220
The first approach is a moral analysis of the question of torture. Ethicists of
different stripes have ventured through numerous twists and turns of moral logic to
217
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arrive at different conclusions about the morality of torture. The argument,
however, can be boiled down into a debate between utilitarianism and deontology.
Utilitarian approaches judge an action according to its ability to achieve the greatest
good for the greatest number of people. Should torturing a single individual prove
to save the lives of hundreds or thousands of others, the action of torturing could be
deemed justifiable. This is ultimately the argument the Bush Administration has
made. When vetoing an Intelligence Authorization bill including prohibitions
against torture, for example, President Bush argued, ―if we were to shut down this
program and restrict the CIA…we could lose vital information from senior al Qaeda
terrorists, and that could cost American lives.‖ 221
Though opponents on Capitol Hill can have hearings with intelligence officials, who will
offer as much information as possible without compromising national security, the
testimony will still not be complete or provide enough evidence to satisfy the skepticism.
When reports of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay are released by the
media, as well as photos of that abuse, it is automatically related to the entire CIA‘s
interrogation program.
It has been confirmed, however, that Abu Ghraib abuses were isolated, and those
conducting the abuse were reprimanded and disciplined appropriately. Something that
would not be made known would be how some of the prisoners at the Iraqi prison
actually felt about how Americans ran the prison, as compared to Iraqis. Richard
Saccone discusses this after his most recent trip to the Iraqi prison:
Inquiring where the conditions were better she (International Red Cross
representative) admitted they were better at Abu Ghraib but she said, ―We should
expect the conditions to be worse in Vietnam and Cambodia.‖ I wonder how she
would have responded to the September 2006, UK Telegraph report of how
prisoners reacted when Americans turned over Abu Ghraib to Iraqi authorities. One
prisoner was quoted as saying, ―The Americans were better than the Iraqis. They
treated us better.‖ Another reportedly shouted, ―Please help us, we want the human
rights officers, we want the Americans to come back.‖ A third, Haleem Aleulami
who had been released from jail said, ―The Americans had treated him better when
they ran the jail.‖222
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In their article about new details emerging about Abu Ghraib prison abuse, Scott Higham
and Joe Stephens of the Washington Post wrote:
The detainees said they were savagely beaten and repeatedly humiliated sexually by
American soldiers working on the night shift at Tier 1A in Abu Ghraib during the
holy month of Ramadan, according to copies of the statements obtained by The
Washington Post. The statements provide the most detailed picture yet of what
took place on the cellblock. Some of the detainees described being abused as
punishment or discipline after they were caught fighting or with a prohibited item.
Some said they were pressed to denounce Islam or were force-fed pork and liquor.
Many provided graphic details of how they were sexually humiliated and assaulted,
threatened with rape, and forced to masturbate in front of female soldiers. 223
We have already noted that Abu Ghraib was not the only prison that raised
controversy among critics of the CIA and the handling of enemy combatants.
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba also became a hot button issue for skeptics of the treatment of
detainees, the interrogation program, and the legality of the detainees‘ due process. Dr.
Carafano, Steven Groves, and Janice Smith wrote the following: ―In violation of the
Geneva Conventions and the customary laws of war, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters in
Afghanistan wear no uniforms or insignia. Unlike the soldiers of every nation that seeks
the protections of the Geneva Conventions and other laws of war, Taliban and al-Qaeda
fighters refuse to carry their arms openly. Such choices drastically increase the dangers of
war to the civilians among whom Taliban and al-Qaeda forces hide.‖224
If no uniform is worn by the enemy to distinguish an organized military
combatant, then domestic or international criminal law cannot easily be carried out in the
same way against CIA officials conducting enhanced interrogation because Geneva does
not overtly apply to terrorism. Also, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 to allow military tribunals to commence, but members of
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Congress still question the legality of detainment facilities like Guantanamo Bay. This
sentiment was defended by Congressman David Price during an ethics symposium when
he stated: ―While Supreme Court justices and brilliant legal scholars have engaged in
fascinating debates about the legality and morality of the Bush Administration‘s justice
system for terrorist suspects, reaching an array of different conclusions about the
theoretical validity of Guantanamo Bay, the military commissions system, and the like,
few would attempt to argue that this legal regime actually works.‖225
One of the major criticisms about Guantanamo Bay is the fact that not only are
the detainees being mistreated, but they are being held at Gitmo for too long without
going through the military tribunals.
As of May 2007, approximately 380 detainees were being held at Guantanamo Bay.
Only about 60 to 80 of them are expected to stand trial before military commissions
for their individual criminal acts. This list includes Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the
confessed mastermind of the September 11 attacks, and Ramzi Bin al-Shib, the socalled 20th hijacker. The remaining detainees are being held not because of any
alleged criminal conduct but because (1) they fought against U.S. and Coalition
forces in Afghanistan and (2) U.S. special military tribunals have determined that
they are too dangerous to be released back into the world and would likely rejoin
the fighting against U.S. and Coalition forces. 226
With the experiences of National Guardsman Sean Baker at Guantanamo Bay as a
less than stellar example of the facility‘s track record, the ICRC, media, and human rights
groups have continued to declare that the treatment of the detainees at Gitmo is
inhumane. Peter Brookes, a Senior Fellow of national security and foreign affairs for the
Heritage Foundation, weighed in on the topic stating, ―Despite living in extraordinary
times after 9/11, critics claim Gitmo is an abuse of U.S. government power and evidence
of America losing its moral bearings and credibility as the leader of the free world...
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Human rights groups and civil liberties advocates who beat the drum to ‗try them or set
them free‘ continue to rail against Gitmo, affecting international perceptions of the
United States across the globe.‖227 President Obama took these concerns to heart and
signed Executive Order 13492 to have the prison shut down and the prisoners to be tried,
transferred, or released outright.
In view of the significant concerns raised by these detentions, both within the
United States and internationally, prompt and appropriate disposition of the
individuals currently detained at Guantánamo and closure of the facilities in which
they are detained would further the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States and the interests of justice... If any individuals covered by this
order remain in detention at Guantanamo at the time of closure of those detention
facilities, they shall be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a
third country, or transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner
consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the
United States.228
Of course, on the other side of this argument, President Obama and other critics of
Guantanamo either failed to mention or did not know that the facility has a few things
going in its favor in regards to the type of treatment enemy combatants receive and the
rights they enjoy:
The detainees have more access and better access to health care than the soldiers
and the dependents on the island. The new detention facilities built at the camp are
exactly like the most modern federal prison facilities in the United States... There
are, on average, two lawyers and three reporters for every detainee in Guantanamo.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has a presence there, on average,
about one out of every three days. And committee representatives have
unaccompanied access to the detainees whenever they want it...Every detainee at
Guantanamo has had his detention status reviewed by a formal board. Of the 400 or
so detainees still there, about 120 have been determined eligible to be released to
their home country or other country. They are being sent home as soon as countries
agree to accept them and not torture them. Three hundred and fifteen have already
been released from Guantanamo, including five in the month I visited. The others
are given an annual review board to determine if detention is still warranted. In
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addition, the detainees have the right to challenge their detention in U.S. federal
civilian courts.229
Only time will tell how Executive Orders 13491 and 13492 will affect how the CIA
detains and interrogates detainees.
This ends the analysis regarding whether or not the CIA should employ their
enhanced interrogation program to combat the War on Terror. There were many reasons
for and against the program, and as the war has continued, a leadership change in the
White House and on Capitol Hill has occurred. Policies from the previous
Administration have been reversed by the new Administration, and now the CIA itself is
in a state of transition. What changes have been made to the interrogation program that
the CIA has been implementing for nearly a decade? What current threats exist, and is
the Agency equipped to handle those threats?

6

PRESENT DAY: WHERE THE CIA CURRENTLY STANDS ON
ENHANCED INTERROGATION

6.1

INTRODUCTION
Chapter Six will be a look at where the CIA is today under the Obama

Administration. There will be some comparisons between what the Agency is doing now
and what it did under the Bush Administration. How have the executive orders that
President Obama signed affected the way the CIA fights the War on Terror? How does it
affect how they interrogate enemy combatants? What has happened to the al Qaeda
detainees at Guantanamo Bay since President Obama signed the order to close the
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prison? Finally, this chapter will summarize by reviewing controversies that surround the
Agency internationally and internally.

6.2

WHERE IS THE CIA TODAY?
The Associated Press stated in an article regarding future al Qaeda attacks on the

United States,
Al Qaeda can be expected to attempt an attack on the United States in the next three
to six months, CIA Director Panetta, Homeland Security Director Napolitano, and
others told Congress Tuesday. The terrorist organization is deploying operatives to
the United States to carry out new attacks from inside the country, including ‗clean‘
recruits with a negligible trail of terrorist contacts, CIA Director Leon Panetta said.
Al Qaeda is also inspiring homegrown extremists to trigger violence on their own,
Panetta added.230
Since 9/11 the CIA has done a good job defending the country and making sure that
another terrorist attack like that day would never happen again. It has been nearly ten
years since that attack occurred on American soil, and since then, numerous high-level al
Qaeda operatives have either been killed or captured, including Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, Abu Zabaydah, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Majid Khan, and
Abu Zubair Al Haili. 231 All these men were involved with either al Qaeda or Osama bin
Laden, all had high rankings in the terrorist network, and were either involved with 9/11,
the attack on the USS Cole, or other major terrorist attacks across the globe. 232
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Since 9/11 twenty-three major terrorist plots have been foiled due to the efforts of
the CIA, their counterparts around the world, and the United States military. 233 When the
elections of 2008 ended, however, critics of the CIA‘s program were empowered.
When President Obama took over in January 2009 he made it very clear that the
United States would no longer tolerate a CIA that went against the Constitution of the
United States or international law.234 His Office of Professional Responsibility within the
Justice Department came out with an extensive report detailing the legal reasons why the
CIA‘s enhanced interrogation program violated U.S. and international law. The report
also noted why the declassified CIA/Justice Department memos did not accurately
analyze the rationale for the program. Among some of the reasons listed for the faulty
justification of the program, the OPR stated that the documented SERE training was not
implemented to the full extent of an actual real-life interrogation where helplessness may
occur. It also noted that Assistant Attorney General, John Yoo, was pressured by the
Bush Administration to quickly justify the legality of the program. 235 The report also
goes on to detail that Yoo was asked by the CIA to see if the Agency could get advanced
pardons in case of prosecution for utilizing ETI‘s, as well as Yoo telling the OPR that a
majority of the techniques did not come close to the legal standard of torture but
waterboarding did. 236 President Obama delivered a speech at the National Archives
Museum on May 21, 2009 and stated specifically about enhanced interrogation,
Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib:
233
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First, I banned the use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques by the United
States of America...What‘s more, they (enhanced interrogation) undermine the rule
of law...The second decision that I made was to order the closing of the prison camp
at Guantanamo Bay...There is also no question that Guantanamo set back the moral
authority that is America‘s strongest currency in the world... In the images from
Abu Ghraib and the brutal interrogation techniques made public long before I was
President, the American people learned of actions taken in their name that bear no
resemblance to the ideals that generations of Americans have fought for... But our
Constitution has endured through secession and civil rights - through World War
and Cold War - because it provides a foundation of principles that can be applied
pragmatically; it provides a compass that can help us find our way. 237
The decision to halt the enhanced interrogation program did not just start with Executive
Orders 13491 and 13492. The volume of criticism raging over how detainees were
treated at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, and while in custody of the CIA at
undisclosed black sites, were supporters of the new President and his promise to change
the CIA‘s interrogation program. Along with the detainee treatment, critics also pointed
fingers at the Agency for committing acts of torture while interrogating the enemy
combatants.238 They claimed it was in serious violation of the Geneva Conventions. This
was one of President Obama‘s major promises in his campaign, so the President knew he
had to deliver some action within his first 100 days of office. 239
Though former Vice President Dick Cheney implored President Obama to not end
the interrogation program, he went further to ask him in an interview and a written
request to at least let the American people see the good the Agency has done for the
nation‘s national security. 240 Cheney wanted only certain aspects of the program to be
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declassified as well as some of the findings as a result of the program to be declassified to
show the American people that what the CIA was doing was in the nation‘s best interest
and not in any violation of international or domestic policy. 241 President Obama took a
different direction and decided to declassify four CIA memos in their entirety between
the Agency and the Bush Justice Department about the legality of the interrogation
program. 242 Though the Bush Justice Department found what the CIA did in their
enhanced interrogation program was legal and not violating domestic or international
law, the Obama Administration has continued to this day to hold its ground and keep the
CIA‘s program at a standstill. 243
The military commissions of the imprisoned terrorists at Guantanamo Bay had
been put on hold due to the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Supreme Court case of June 2006.244
The Court concluded that the military commission did not have the authority to try
Hamdan with the charges that were presented, and that any attempt at carrying out the
trial would be in violation of the Geneva Conventions as well as the laws of war. 245
President Bush declared this unacceptable in his speech to the nation regarding the CIA
interrogation program and the transfer of CIA prisoners to Guantanamo; he wanted
Congress to pass legislation that specifically addressed the Court‘s concerns with the
commissions so the imprisoned terrorists could be brought to justice. 246 Now, KSM and
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other high-level terrorists are still going to be placed on trial, but it is a matter of what
type of trial that they will ultimately be facing. The recent Obama decision on once again
employing military commissions now seems to put the debate to rest where KSM and the
others will be tried.
If the War on Terror was over at this point in time a brief hiatus for the CIA
interrogation program and the suspension of military commissions would seem
acceptable actions for the new President to make in order to appease critics.
Unfortunately, the war appears far from over, and it would also appear that terrorists‘
resolve has only strengthened instead of weakened. Now that the CIA and the military
have been limited by their own government, there is a fear of prosecution of any past,
present, or current apprehension and interrogation of a terrorist. 247 It was not just
Executive Orders 13491 and 13492, but the release of the CIA interrogation memos in
April of 2009 and the potential of former Bush Administration and CIA officials being
prosecuted for violating United States law and the Geneva Conventions, which had a
chilling effect on CI efforts in the War on Terror.248
Officers are saying, "The things I'm doing now — will this happen to me in five
years because of the things I am doing now?" And the answer they've been given
by senior leadership is the only answer possible, which is, "I can't guarantee you
that won't happen, but I do know it won't happen under this president." The basic
foundation of the legitimacy of the agency's action has shifted from some durability
of law to a product of the American political process. So I think the really
dangerous effect of this, Chris, is that you will have agency officers stepping back
from the kinds of things that the nation expects them to do. I mean, if you were to
go to an agency officer today and say, "Go do this," and, "Why am I authorized to
do this?" And I say, "Well, it's authorized by the president. The attorney general
says it's lawful. And it's been briefed to Congress." That agency officer's going to
say, "Yeah, I know, but I see what's going on here now. Have you run it by the
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ACLU? What's the New York Times editorial board think? Have you discussed this
with any potential presidential candidates?" 249
So despite the fact that the Bush Justice Department has reviewed the interrogation
program, and it received the go-ahead by the Bush Administration, CIA officials are now
concerned about future legal complications. Former CIA director, General Michael
Hayden, confided in an interview with Fox News‘ Chris Wallace: ―Throughout the
conduct of this program, over the years of its existence, the comportment of the CIA
agents who have been conducting these interrogations have been entirely within United
States law and the Constitution. These programs have been under a very, very strict
supervision carried out by very, very professional officers who are totally committed to
complying with United States law.‖250 Hayden continued, ―Our CIA interrogators and
our CIA agents want to and are committed to behaving in a constitutional, a legal and
lawful manner, and in a way that is consistent with our international obligations.‖251
The Obama Administration has gone back and forth on whether or not to
prosecute CIA officials, as well as Bush Administration officials, regarding
waterboarding and other enhanced interrogation techniques. The destruction of CIA
interrogation tapes is also a topic of controversy and concern. Nonetheless, the Obama
Administration seems to have decided not to prosecute.252 Former D/CIA Hayden thinks
that this is just the beginning for the legal ramifications of the interrogation program: ―If
you look at the letters that Director Panetta and Director Blair put out to the Intelligence
249
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Community workforce, near the end of both letters they make it very clear this is not the
end of it. In fact, they suggest it's just the beginning. There will be more revelations.
There will be more commissions. There will be more investigations. And this to an
agency that is at war and is on the front lines defending America.‖253
Restricting the CIA to adhering strictly to the Army Field Manual’s interrogation
methods and the release of the CIA memos are not the only problem. Now that all this
information is available for public consumption, the terrorists now know the limits the
CIA and the military can go in regards to interrogation and extracting information. 254
Also in an interview with Fox News‘ Chris Wallace, former DNI, John Negroponte,
opined: ―Those techniques were applied only when expressly permitted by the director,
and are described in these opinions in detail, along with their limits and the safeguards
applied to them.‖255 In the same light, Hayden, with help from writer Michael Mukasey,
echoed former DNI Negroponte and went into more specific detail by stating:
Details of these successes, and the methods used to obtain them, were disclosed
repeatedly in more than 30 congressional briefings and hearings beginning in 2002,
and open to all members of the Intelligence Committees of both Houses of
Congress beginning in September 2006. Any protestation of ignorance of those
details, particularly by members of those committees, is pretense... Of the thousands
of unlawful combatants captured by the U.S., fewer than 100 were detained and
questioned in the CIA program. Of those, less than one-third were subjected to any
of the techniques discussed in these opinions... In addition, there were those who
believed that the U.S. deserved what it got on Sept. 11, 2001. Such people, and
many who purport to speak for world opinion, were resourceful both before and
after the Sept. 11 attacks in crafting reasons to resent America's role as a
superpower. Recall also that the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the
attacks on our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the punctiliously correct trials of
defendants in connection with those incidents, and the bombing of the USS Cole
took place long before the advent of CIA interrogations. 256
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At this point, the biggest concern would be the fact that failed attacks have
occurred more frequently over the last two years. Without the CIA‘s enhanced
interrogation program in effect to help gather intelligence on future attacks, more seem
threatening without even this small insight into the future. In 2009, the country saw the
failed Underwear Bomber on Christmas Day aboard a plane bound for Detroit,
Michigan.257 Even though the attack failed, it was a demonstration of the post-enhanced
interrogation era in the United States. Not only was the Intelligence Community aware
of Abdulmutallab, but while in FBI custody he also warned that more like him were
coming.258 ―The suspect's father was so concerned about his son's radicalization he
actually alerted the U.S. embassy in Nigeria that his son could be a threat to America.
Abdulmutallab was put on a terror watch list, along with 550,000 others, but he was not
put on the no-fly list. Moreover his U.S. visa, which he obtained a year and a half ago,
was not revoked. He used the visa to board the flight to Detroit Christmas morning.‖259
Fortunately, passengers prevented him from completely detonating the bomb.
Soon after the FBI had him in custody, but after only an hour of questioning they gave
him his Miranda rights. He now awaits civilian criminal trial for terrorist acts and
attempted murder instead of being treated as an enemy combatant and placed in a military
commission.260 Current DNI Dennis Blair determined that all decisions about whether
terrorist suspects appear in a criminal court or in front of a military commission would be
257
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decided on a case-by-case basis.261 Furthermore, Blair went on to say: ―The handling of
terror suspects requires flexibility to allow for the appropriate response in each case.‖262
The Obama Administration‘s stance on reading Miranda rights to suspected
terrorists maintains that useful information can be produced while the suspect is
interrogated under full rights. FBI Director Robert Mueller agreed saying: ―that
providing a suspect with Miranda rights can bring better information than traditional
military or intelligence interrogation.‖ 263 With this failed attack, along with the failed
truck bombing in Times Square on May 2, 2010, and the attack on Fort Hood months
before the underwear bombing attempt, al Qaeda‘s resolve appears to be stronger than
ever especially now that the CIA has been kept at bay from using their enhanced
interrogation program.
A collaborative report with Fox News and the London Times stated: ―Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula, a terrorist cell led by a former personal secretary to Usama bin
Laden, issued a statement saying that the failed attack by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
was a response to American-backed airstrikes on the group in Yemen this month.‖264
Obama D/CIA Leon Panetta, though not in favor of the enhanced interrogation program,
realizes that terrorist cells especially al Qaeda need to be dealt with and brought to
justice. Despite the interrogation program being suspended, Panetta might try to
persuade the President to reinstate the program.
―The biggest threat is not so much that we face an attack like 9/11. It is that Al
Qaeda is adapting its methods in ways that oftentimes make it difficult to detect,‖
Panetta told the Senate Intelligence Committee. Al Qaeda is increasingly relying on
261
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new recruits with minimal training and simple devices to carry out attacks, the CIA
chief said as part of the annual assessment of national threats provided to Congress
by the top five U.S. intelligence officials. Panetta also warned of the danger of
extremists acting alone: "It's the lone-wolf strategy that I think we have to pay
attention to as the main threat to this country,‖ he said.‖265
7

CONCLUSION
In his national address on September 6, 2006, President Bush had the following to

say regarding all terrorists who have declared war on America and the Western world:
The terrorists who declared war on America represent no nation, they defend no
territory, and they wear no uniform. They do not mass armies on borders, or flotillas
of warships on the high seas. They operate in the shadows of society; they send
small teams of operatives to infiltrate free nations; they live quietly among their
victims; they conspire in secret, and then they strike without warning. In this new
war, the most important source of information on where the terrorists are hiding and
what they are planning is the terrorists, themselves.266
This study demonstrates that by thoroughly assessing the reasons for and against the
CIA‘s enhanced interrogation program, the legality of the program and the necessity for it
can be clarified. The purpose of the enhanced interrogation program is to gather
intelligence from enemy combatants on terrorist operations and potential attacks. 267
Since 9/11 the CIA has been able to use intelligence gathered from the interrogations of
captured enemy combatants. The self-professed mastermind of 9/11, KSM, was
apprehended. Through his interrogation utilizing enhanced methods like waterboarding,
the Agency was able to apprehend numerous other high-level terrorists from various
networks, learn invaluable information about al Qaeda‘s operating structure, terrorist
financing, communications and logistics, planning, target selection, recruitment
techniques, and stopped several potentially devastating plot attempts.
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Critics of the program still do not understand its purpose. Despite the Bush
Justice Department legal memos that the techniques were legal and did not violate any
domestic or international law, opponents still adamantly state that the CIA and its
program is breeding more terrorists and placing the country‘s national security at greater
risk. This is, however, what the terrorists want. They want to see the U.S. on the moral
defensive rather than on the offensive. The Intelligence Community still looked into
potential threats on the country, but before 9/11, they thought as did the whole nation that
the United States was invincible.
Despite the leadership changes in the CIA and other parts of the Intelligence
Community, they are still dedicated to keeping America safe and will attempt not to
make the same mistakes that brought on 9/11.268 Recent failed attacks on this country
and warnings of future attacks should spark the government to take action and allow the
Agency to continue doing its job. What the Agency was doing before was not only
working, it was legal. The Agency would never videotape and then broadcast beheadings
of enemy combatants nor mutilate them or dismember them. That is what the enemy
does. That is torture and in violation of the Geneva Conventions. The CIA closely
monitors the enhanced interrogations to ensure that nothing to that extent would ever
happen to not only protect their agents and officials, but to uphold the country‘s laws as
well as maintaining the CIA‘s reputation. 269
Once reports of prisoner abuse came to light at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay
and the elections of 2008 brought in new political leadership, the possible suspension of
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the program became a harsh reality. Now that secret black sites of the CIA are being
closed down, questions are being raised as to what the United States is going to do with
the remaining detainees still in custody. KSM and others still wait at Gitmo to learn their
fate, but if it was not for the CIA and its enhanced interrogation program, they might still
be connected to terrorism. As Steven Kleinman wrote:
In prosecuting the Global War on Terror, the targets of primary interest from both
an operational and intelligence perspective are terrorism‘s critical centers of
gravity: financing, transportation, logistics, communications, and safe havens. Just
as it would not be reasonable to expect any single analyst to be an accomplished
subject matter expert in more than one (or possibly two) of these areas, it should not
be assumed that any single interrogator can be prepared to explore the full
knowledge ability of sources who have information pertaining to these key target
areas.270
The CIA enhanced interrogation program should be employed to combat the War on
Terror, and the program should not have been halted by President Obama, especially with
the growing hostility presently in the Middle East. But the review and monitoring of the
interrogations by the DOJ is essential to refute the morally damaging charge of torture,
and reassure a sensitive Congress that all interrogations are in conformity with American
law.

8

EPILOGUE: KSM AND AL QAEDA TERRORISTS’ TRIAL AS WELL
AS THE FUTURE OF THE CIA’S ENHANCED INTERROGATION
PROGRAM
From the New Yorker, columnist Jane Mayer conducted an interview with

Obama-appointed CIA director Leon Panetta. In her article, she stated:
But, as Panetta sees it, the C.I.A.‘s effort to ―disrupt, destroy, and dismantle‖ Al
Qaeda remains its top priority. The agency continues to acquire intelligence
270
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suggesting that Al Qaeda is planning attacks on America, he told me. ―We‘re
conducting pretty robust operations in Pakistan, and I think we‘re doing a good job
of trying to disrupt Al Qaeda. But, clearly, that is a threat.‖ The greatest danger, he
said, is that Al Qaeda will ―find other safe havens to go to,‖ in states such as
Somalia and Yemen. ―Our mission is to make sure they can‘t find a place to hide.‖
Finding and bringing to justice Al Qaeda‘s leaders—in particular, Osama bin Laden
and Ayman al-Zawahiri—―remains a focal point,‖ Panetta said. 271
There is no guarantee at this point in time what will happen to KSM and the other highlevel enemy combatants in U.S. custody. They are still being held at Guantanamo despite
President Obama signing Executive Order 13492 to close the facility. There was debate
late in 2009 and earlier in 2010 on whether the detainees should be transferred to prisons
in the United States and appear in a civilian criminal court in New York City. 272
The deadline to close Gitmo has come and gone despite President Obama
promising that the facility would be closed within one year of signing the order. ―The
executive order also stipulates: ‗If any individuals covered by this order remain in
detention at Guantanamo at the time of closure of those detention facilities, they shall be
returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to
another United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States.‘‖ 273
President Obama put an unnerving spin on this point of the order by mentioning
the potential return of detainees to their home country or being granted outright release.
―‗Can we guarantee that they [the detainees] are not going to try to participate in another
attack? No. But what I can guarantee is that if we don't uphold our Constitution and our
values that over time that will make us less safe. And that will be a recruiting tool for
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organizations like al Qaeda.‘‖ 274 Over the last year and a half, a bill has been debated in
Congress, H.R. 5136: the Defense Authorization Act, which has provisions to not only
keep detainees at Guantanamo Bay but for military commissions to recommence at the
facility for those detainees.275 With the mid-term elections of 2010 behind the nation, the
Republican Party taking a majority in the House and gaining several seats in the Senate,
President Obama reluctantly signed the Defense Authorization Act into law on January 7,
2011.276
Once the notion was put out to the nation that the Federal Government was
thinking about moving the detainees to prisons in the States and trying KSM in a civilian
criminal court in New York City, there was a substantial backlash by not just
Republicans in Congress, but Democrats as well and especially by the American
public.277 Though the Defense Authorization Act has now been signed into law, there is
no telling how long it will remain law with ongoing debate in Congress and a constantly
shifting Executive branch.
The provisions expire on September 30, at the end of the current fiscal year. What
happens at that point depends on what Congress decides on defense authorization.
Until then, the law will make it very difficult for the Obama administration to
pursue criminal trials for terrorism suspects, including the self-professed
mastermind of the September 11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who had been
slated to face a trial in New York.278
Despite signing the Defense Authorization Act, it is notable that the Obama
Administration is still contemplating bringing them to the United States to stand trial
274
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despite what the American people think about transferring the detainees and their overall
opinion about the CIA‘s enhanced interrogation program.279 ―Though the Obama
administration is pursuing a military trial for the suspected bomber of the USS Cole, an
attack that killed 17 sailors off the coast of Yemen in 2000, the president and his team
have left the door open to a civilian trial for the men thought responsible for the 9/11
attacks including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.‖ 280 A civilian trial could not be a worse
idea for the Obama Administration, the CIA, the military, and U.S. allies across the
world.
This can only strengthen and embolden the terrorists‘ resolve as their militant
message is placed on a grander world stage.
Moreover, KSM and his terrorist allies will use the trial as a propaganda
platform...Indeed, a lawyer for one of the terrorists, Scott Fenstermaker, told the
New York Times that all five men intend to plead not guilty just ‗so they can have a
trial and try to get their message out.‘ Fenstermaker says that his client, Ammar alBaluchi, readily admits he is guilty. ‗He acknowledges that he helped plan the 9/11
attacks, and he says he‘s looking forward to dying.‘ But now Ammar and his
cohorts will deny their guilty and delay their deaths, so they can use the proceedings
to put America and its tactics in the war on terror on trial. 281
The Obama Administration will not try KSM and others in New York, and it appears
military commissions will resume at Guantanamo Bay. What implications will this have
on the CIA‘s enhanced interrogation program when more details of the program are
revealed allowing other terrorists to better prepare for the future will only be revealed
with time. As President Bush notes:
Information from terrorists in CIA custody has played a role in the capture or
questioning of nearly every senior al Qaeda member or associate detained by the
U.S. and its allies since this program began. By providing everything from initial
279
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leads to photo identifications, to precise locations of where terrorists were hiding,
this program has helped us to take potential mass murderers off the streets before
they were able to kill... We will also consult with congressional leaders on how to
ensure that the CIA program goes forward in a way that follows the law that meets
the national security needs of our country, and protects the brave men and women
we ask to obtain information that will save innocent lives... Free nations have faced
new enemies and adjusted to new threats before -- and we have prevailed. Like the
struggles of the last century, today's war on terror is, above all, a struggle for
freedom and liberty. The adversaries are different, but the stakes in this war are the
same: We're fighting for our way of life, and our ability to live in freedom. We're
fighting for the cause of humanity, against those who seek to impose the darkness
of tyranny and terror upon the entire world. 282
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APPENDIX A: POLLING DATA
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APPENDIX B: ABU GHRAIB PHOTOS
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF ACCEPTED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES IN
THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL
1. Direct Approach - the HUMINT collector asks direct questions. The initial
questions may be administrative or nonpertinent but the HUMINT collector
quickly begins asking pertinent questions;
2. Incentive Approach - trading something that the source wants for information.
The thing that you give up may be a material reward, an emotional reward, or the
removal of a real or perceived negative stimulus. There is an inherent suspicion
of the truthfulness of ―bought‖ information. Sources may manufacture
information in order to receive or maintain an incentive;
3. Emotional Approach - centered on how the source views himself and his
interrelationships with others. Through source observation and initial
questioning, the HUMINT collector can often identify dominant emotions that
motivate the EPW/detainee. Although the emotion is the key factor, an
emotional approach is normally worthless without an attached incentive;
4. Emotional Love Approach - focuses on the anxiety felt by the source about the
circumstances in which he finds himself, his isolation from those he loves, and
his feelings of helplessness and the love the source feels toward the appropriate
object: family, homeland, or comrades. The key to the successful use of this
approach is to identify an action that can realistically evoke this emotion (an
incentive) that can be tied to a detained source‘s cooperation;
5. Emotional Hate Approach - focuses on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire
for revenge, the source may feel. It may be effective on members of racial or
religious minorities who have or feel that they have faced discrimination in
109

military and civilian life. The key to the successful use of this approach is to
identify an action that can realistically evoke this emotion (an incentive) that can
be tied to a detained source‘s cooperation;
6. Emotional Fear-Up Approach - The HUMINT collector identifies a preexisting
fear or creates a fear within the source. He then links the elimination or reduction
of the fear to cooperation on the part of the source. The HUMINT collector must
be extremely careful that he does not threaten or coerce a source;
7. Emotional Fear-Down Approach - The HUMINT collector mitigates existing
fear in exchange for cooperation on the part of the source. This is not normally a
formal or even voiced agreement. Instead, the HUMINT collector through verbal
and physical actions calms the source;
8. Emotional-Pride and Ego-Up Approach - It exploits a source's low selfesteem. Many HUMINT sources including EPWs and other detainees, retained
persons, civilian internees, or refugees may suffer from low self-esteem and
feelings of helplessness due to their immediate circumstances;
9. Emotional-Pride and Ego-Down Approach - Approach is based on attacking
the source's ego or self-image. The source, in defending his ego, reveals
information to justify or rationalize his actions. This information may be valuable
in answering collection requirements or may give the HUMINT collector insight
into the viability of other approaches;
10. Emotional Futility - HUMINT collector convinces the source that resistance to
questioning is futile. This engenders a feeling of hopelessness and helplessness
on the part of the source;
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11. The other approaches require considerable time and resources: ―We Know All”
Approach; File and Dossier; Establish Your Identity; Repetition; Rapid
Fire; Silent; Change of Scenery; Mutt and Jeff; Oversight; False Flag; and
Oversight Considerations.290
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF FOILED TERRORIST PLOTS SINCE 9/11
In the days after 9/11, America immediately went to work to prevent another act of
terrorism by reassessing U.S. counterterrorism abilities. Lessons emerged, including the
need for more information sharing down to the state and local level and with our allies,
more intelligence-gathering abilities, and greater integration among the U.S. government
agencies and with state and local governments, industry, and private citizens. The U.S.
addressed these needs by:
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Developing terrorism-fighting legal and investigatory tools, including the
PATRIOT Act and the expansion of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA), to help to identify, prosecute, and convict terrorists.



Increasing information sharing and collective security around the globe through
assistance programs, information-sharing agreements, and the sharing of
counterterrorism best practices.



Developing law enforcement partnerships from the grassroots level up, which
have enabled the U.S. to disrupt the flow of money and resources to terrorist
groups and to prevent acts of terrorism across the United States. The creation of
Joint Terrorism Task Forces has been a key part of this effort.291
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Virginia Jihad Network, June 2003.



Dhiren Barot, August 2004.



James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj, August 2004.



Yassin Aref and Mohammad Hossain, August 2004.



Umer Hayat and Hamid Hayat, June 2005.



Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, Hammad Riaz
Samana, and Kevin James, August 2005.



Michael C. Reynolds, December 2005.

Jena Baker McNeill and James Carafano, July 2, 2009.
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Mohammad Zaki Amawi, Marwan Othman El-Hindi, and Zand Wassim
Mazloum, February 2006.



Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, April 2006.



Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar
Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine,
June 2006.



Assem Hammoud, July 2006.



Liquid Explosives Plot, August 2006.



Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, March 2007.



Fort Dix Plot, May 2007.



JFK Airport Plot, June 2007.



Mohammed Jabarah, January 2008.



Hassan Abujihaad, March 2008.



Christopher Paul, June 2008.



Synagogue Terror Plot, May 2009. 292
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APPENDIX E: LIST OF LEGAL MEMOS FOR AND AGAINST CIA PROGRAM
White House293
Memo from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to Pres. George W. Bush (Jan. 25,
2002) [HTML]
 Gonzales reconsiders, at the request of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Pres.
Bush's decision ―that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not prisoners of war
under the [Geneva Convention].‖ After detailing arguments for and against
prisoner of war status, the White House Counsel concludes that ―[o]n balance, I
believe that the arguments for reconsideration and reversal are unpersuasive.‖
Memo from Pres. George W. Bush (Feb. 2, 2002)
[PDF]
 Subject: Human Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees Relying on the
Justice Department‘s Jan. 22, 2002 memorandum, and Attorney General John
Ashcroft‘s Feb. 1, 2002 legal opinion letter, Pres. Bush declines to apply the
Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees.
U.S. Department of Justice294
Memo from Asst. U.S. Attorney General Bybee to White House Counsel
and Dept. of Defense General Counsel (Jan. 22, 2002) [PDF]
 Subject: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
Letter from U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft's to President Bush (Feb. 1, 2002) [HTML]
 Subject: Taliban status under Geneva Convention
Memo from Asst. U.S. Attorney General Bybee to White House Counsel (Feb. 7, 2002)
[HTML]
 Subject: Taliban status under Geneva Convention
Memo from Asst. U.S. Attorney General Bybee to U.S. Dept. of Defense General
Counsel Haynes (Feb. 26, 2002) [PDF]
 Subject: Potential legal constraints on certain interrogation methods
Memo from the Dept. of Justice to White House Counsel (August 1, 2002) [PDF]
 Subject: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
Letter from Asst. U.S. Attorney General Bybee to White House Counsel (Aug. 1, 2002)
[HTML]
 Subject: Interrogation and Torture

293

U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dept. of Defense, The Wall Street Journal, and George Washington University, ―Bush
Administration‘s Legal Debate over Torture, Interrogation Policies, Treatment of Enemy Combatants, and Detainees,
and the Applicability of Prisoner of War Status,‖ 2002-2004, Available online at:
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/powtorturememos.html. Viewed on March 23, 2011.
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Letter from Acting Asst. U.S. Attorney General Daniel Lewin to Deputy Attorney
General James B. Comey (Dec. 30, 2004) [PDF]
 Subject: Justice Dept. memo redefining standards of conduct for interrogations
under federal criminal prohibitions against torture.
U.S. Department of Defense 295
Memoranda and correspondence among U.S. Department of Defense officials on
interrogation procedures, legal analyses, and orders concerning detainees and prisoners of
war.
Draft Pentagon Working Group Report on "Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on
Terrorism" (March 6, 2003) [HTML]
 The arguments made in the portions of this draft report, originally revealed in an
exclusive by Wall Street Journal reporter Jess Bravin, show how Bush
administration lawyers rationalized that compliance with international treaties and
U.S. laws prohibiting torture could be overlooked because of legal technicalities
and national security concerns.
Memo from Sec'y of Defense Rumsfeld (Jan. 19, 2002) [PDF]
 Sec'y of Defense Rumsfeld tells the Joint Chiefs of Staff that al Qaeda and
Taliban suspects are not entitled to prisoner of war status under the Geneva
Conventions
Message from Chairman Chief of Staff (Jan. 22, 2002) [PDF]
 Message from Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff to the Unified Commands and
Services, informing them that al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not entitled to
prisoner of war status
Memo to the Commander of Joint Task Force 170 (October 11, 2002) [PDF]
 From Major General Michael Dunlavey. Includes legal recommendations from a
DoD lawyer, Staff Judge Advocate, LTC Diane E. Beaver, that interrogating
detainees using certain strategies (e.g., 20 hour interrogations, forced shaving, use
of stress-induced phobias like fear of dogs, telling detainee that he or his family
are in imminent danger of ―fac[ing] death or severely painful consequences‖), ―do
not violate applicable federal law.‖ but ―that interrogations involving Category II
and III methods undergo a legal review prior to their commencement.‖
Memo from U.S. Army Commander James T. Hill (Oct. 25, 2002) [HTML]
 Gen. Hill expresses frustration to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "some detainees
have tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods," but also remains
unclear about the legal status of certain interrogation techniques. He is
"particularly troubled by the use of implied or expressed threats of death of the
detainee or his family."
Memo from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approving counter resistance techniques
(December 2, 2002) [PDF]
295
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Rumsfeld suggests that detainees might be forced to stand for 8 – 10 hours a day,
and asks ―Why is standing limited to 4 hours?‖

Memo from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld‘s to Commander, SOUTHCOM rescinding
certain counter resistance techniques (January 15, 2003) [PDF]
 Rumsfeld rescinds all Category II interrogation techniques that he approved in his
Dec. 2, 2002 memo, and one Category III technique. Requests for using such
interrogation methods must be forwarded directly to Rumsfeld, along with a
―thorough justification‖ and "a detailed plan for the use of such techniques.‖
Memo from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld‘s to General Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Defense
(January 15, 2003) [PDF]
 Rumsfeld asks the Pentagon's top lawyer to form "a working group" in order "to
assess the legal, policy, and operational issues relating to the interrogations of
detainees held by the U.S. Armed forces in the war on terrorism.
U.S. Department of Justice296
Report by the Office of Professional Responsibility (July 29, 2009) [PDF]
 Investigation into the legality of the CIA‘s use of their enhanced interrogation
program

296

Office of Professional Responsibility, ―Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel‘s Memoranda Concerning
Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency‘s Use of ‗Enhanced Interrogation Techniques‘ on Suspected
Terrorists,‖ July 29, 2009.
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